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1. - THE NEED FOR A PROSPECTIVE
AND RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS
It has become clear in the past couple of years that the EU sees itself
as having a large role to play in the field of unification of rules of Private
International Law (PILl, included the sub discipline International Family
Law (IFL). The first Regulation in the field of PIL that came into force
was a regulation on IFL, namely the Brussels II Regulation, (1) And
though Brussels II still remains the only regulation in the field of IFL that
has taken effect, it must certainly not be seen as a one-off: if it is up to
the EU, there will be more of such legislation concerning the discipline of
IFL in the future,
What is less clear is what form this legislation shall have. The Brussels II
Regulation is apparently a device for stimulating intra-communitarian
mobility. A closer look reveals that Brussels II partly already concerns
(*) Associate Professor Private International Law, University of Leiden, The Netherlands,
v,vandeneeckhout@law.leidenuniv,nl.
(1) Oouncil Regulation (EO) no. 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility
for children of both spouses, O,J" L160 30,06.2000, p, 19, The situation will change as of
1 March 2005, when current rules will be replaced by a new Regulation (see Oouncil Regulation
(EO) no, 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing
Regulation (EO), no. 1347/2000, OJ., 23 December 2003, p, 1-29), See for a presentation of these
recent developments M, TENREIRO and M. EKS'fROM, "Unification of private international law
in family matters within the European Union", in K. BOELE-WOELKI (red.), Perspectives for the
unification and harmonisation of family law in Europe, Antwerpen: Intersentia 2003, pp. 185-
193, and, in a critical way, D. VAN ITERSON, "Het Franse voorstel tot afschaffing van het exe-
quatur voor beslissingen inzake omgangsrecht" and M, SUMAMPOUW, "Voorstel Verordening oud-
erHjke verantwoordelijkheid: een voorbeeld hoe het niet moet", both in H,F,G, LE~fAIRE and
P, VLAS (red,), Met recht verkregen: bundel opstellen aangeboden aan Mr, Ingrid S, JOPPE,
Deventer: Kluwer 2002,
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family relationships with "external" aspects (2). Debates about the regula-
tion of IFL aspects concerning family relationships on an "extra-commu-
nitarian" level are, however, still dealt with at national level.
Thus, the debate about the regulation by the ED of IFL issues of family
relationships with external aspects has not been very relevant until now.
One must however re-focus in this field as it cannot be ruled out that the
ED will deal in the future with the regulation of legal family relationships
with external aspects on a more fundamental basis than in Brussels II.
Anyone that must re-focus with regards to ED interference in IFL in
2004 will necessarily be pushed to work in a prospective manner. Even so,
a retrospective manner together with an evaluation of the status quo
should not be left out: anyone that looks into the "how" and "why" of ED
interference in family relationships with external aspects, will inevitably be
confronted with the "how" and "why" of the ED's PIL and IFL policy as
such. At the same time a question arises about the ED's interference com-
pared to the way ED-Member States currently deal with IFL in relation
to external aspects. As far as it concerns tendencies in the national context,
in this paper especially the Dutch situation shall be examined further. (3)
Finally one should realise that in analysing IFL, in relationship to the ED,
one should regularly ask in what way one can learn from past experiences
and current affairs in the field of PIL in general: (4) IFL is, of course, a
(2) In the preamble of the Brussels II regulation, it is stated in a rather laconic way: "The
measures laid down in this Regulation should be consistent and uniform, to enable people to
move as widely as possible. Accordingly, it should also apply to nationals of non-member States
whose links with the territory of an Member State are sufficiently close, in keeping with the
grounds of jurisdiction laid down in the Regulation".
(3) Due to the necessary prospective charaoter of this theme, this paper shall pay a fair
amount of attention, possibly more than in other papers, to the way in whioh national
authorities currently develop and use IFL.
(4) Important insights into the relationship between EU law and PIL were developed mainly
in French and German doctrine even before the Treaty of Amsterdam. See e.g. M. WILDERSPIN
and X. LEWIS, "Les relations entre Ie droit oommunautaire et les regles de conflits de lois des
Etats membres", R.O.D.!.P. 2002, pp. 1-37. These insights primarily concerned to what extent
EO Law can have an impact on PIL via the four freedoms and the prinoiple of non-disorimination.
New insights developed after the Treaty of Amsterdam, this time from the perspeotive of the
accordance of own regulatory powers of the EU institutions themselves. A question is : what can
be learned from those analyses, the current developments, and the questions that arise from the
field of PIL in general. For example, what can be learned from German disoussions about the
principle of non-discrimination as put forward in the EO Treaty if nationality is used as a con-
necting faotor. What can also be learned from disoussions in international contracts law and inter-
national tort law on the granting of a universal or limited geographical scope on PIL regulations
with regards to the applicable law? The same goes for discussions about the need for unification
of International or substantive private law, the problems about the relationship between ED-Reg-
ulations and other international PIL sources (and, in interaction with this, the interpretation of
ERTA case law). The latter shall not be dealt with in this piece exoept for what is mentioned
infra, under 4.1., especially footnote 111, but more information can be found in C. JOUSTRA, "Naar
een communautair internationaal privaatrecht", in Preadviezen. Internationaal, communautair en
nationaal IPR", Mededelingen van de Nede1'landse Vereniging VOOI' internationaal recht, Den Haag
Asser Press 2002 and M. TRAEsT, "De verhouding van de Europese Gemeensohap tot de confe-
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sub discipline of the wider field of PIL. Not only is EU interference in IFL
currently an issue but in general in the entire field of PIL.
II. - INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW
= SOFT LAW?
11.1. - The esotel'l:c and stubborn character of IFL
The field of PIL is traditionally seen as having a large ivory tower con-
tent. This is possibly due to the fact that PIL can be characterised as a
"second rate law" as PIL, as a discipline, is occupied with the private legal
relationships in an international context and therefore includes provisions
on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement without get-
ting embroiled with the substantive legal aspects of the case at hand. The
sub discipline IFL probably deserves the label of being an esoteric science
even more so than PIL as a whole. IFL is said to be strongly ideologically
defined which leads to people not treading lightly into the field without
prior knowledge. PIL jurists seem to have the tendency to make the sub
discipline IFL into a separate entity and are reserved, therefore, in apply-
ing general developments in PIL to it. PIL jurists often concentrate on
either IFL or PIL outside of ILF whereby the influencing of one sub dis-
cipline by another usually proves to be the exception that proves the rule.
PIL outside IFL and IFL are therefore able to develop separately. This
separate development together with the "second rate" character of IFL
means that IFL is isolated and therefore has a couple of inaccessible and
unique traits. (5)
II.2. - Cultural and economic aspects
of Intemational Family Law
IFL deals with relationships in Family Law that take place in an inter-
national context and is partly therefore already embedded in the debate on
the "collision of cultures". IFL has, consequently, the reputation of being
rather a "soft" field of law, where emotions can run up very high. That tra-
dition of examining IFL as a manner of handling a collision of cultures,
results in the placing of IFL into the debate about integration, specifically
in the cultural aspects of this debate. By 2004 developments of IFL have
rentie van Den Haag voor het internationaaI privaatrecht: een vergelijkende analyse van hun
wederzijdse beinvloeding, interferentie en hun bijdrage tot de integratie van het internationaal
privaatrecht", PhD Ugent 2002, 628 p. (recently published as De Europese Gemeenschap en de
Haagse OonJerentie vaar het internatianaal privaatrecht, Antwerpen: MakIn 2003).
(5) This sometimes leads to IFL withstanding developments for It very long time, for example
concerning equal treatment of men and women.
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been placed almost completely in the debate on respect for cultural diver-
sity and it is usual in this to pay attention to the (legal) cultural differences
of certain migrant groups. This is how the discussion on IFL is placed
within the debate on "integration", where a lot of focus is placed on the
alleged differences of certain migrant groups too.
The result of all this is that whereas those that practice other fields of
the law as for example Immigration Law, Social Security Law, National-
ity Law, Tax Law, etc. are faced with legal questions of IFL, the PIL
questions that arise are largely left unanswered or only marginally
answered. When a deeper analysis is required, questions are transferred to
PIL specialists. PIL specialists for their part mostly study IFL as an iso-
lated science, set apart from other fields and their developments.
What is in danger of being left out here is what I call the "socio-eco-
nomic component" of IFL. (6) That IFL has such a component becomes
clear if one recognises that IFL can be examined from two different per-
spectives.
On the one hand IFL as a discipline is concerned with regulating parti-
cular aspects of relationships in Family Law that have international
aspects, in particular the aspects of jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition
and enforcement. Examined from this point of view, IFL aims only to reg-
ulate family life, or at least certain aspects of family life that take place in
an international context. On the other hand the outcome of an IFL dispute
also functions as a link in a chain of legal questions. In other words, the
outcome of a dispute of IFL often forms the link between on the one hand
rules concerning Family Law, and on the other rules of "Migration
Law". (7) Rules of IFL do not stipulate whether or not married partners
or also unmarried partners qualify for family reunification - these rules are
by their nature to be classified as rules of migration law. Nevertheless, ru~es
of IFL are very important when defining the notion of "married part~r"
or "unmarried partner" and therefore determining a person's public legal
claims. In other words, it is not the field of IFL that determines whether
one can ascribe public legal claims based on certain family relationships or
not. Rather when a decision in an area of public law has been taken, IFL
rules are crucial in the evaluation of public legal claims based on family
relationships with an international dimension. An example of the above
would be the acceptance or not of a foreign marriage or a foreign judicial
decision entailing the changing of a foreigners age - these are typical IFL
(6) What is interesting is that even where IFL is analysed in relation to the debate on inte-
gration, it is only analysed in its "cultural" aspects. Almost no attention is paid to the socio-
economic aspects of IFL.
(7) Whereby Migration Law in this context means all public legal claims within the law gov-
erning residence, nationality and social security based on family relations.
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cases. These can be important in cases of claiming residence or claims to
pension rights and child benefit. In such cases IFL must be seen as more
than just a couple of rules governing family relationships with an interna-
tional context: IFL has socio-economic consequences where it serves as a
link between the rules governing Family Law on the one hand and rules of
Public Law on the other.
If one examines IFL from this angle, then it appears IFL has recently
sailed into turbulent waters and has arrived at a stage of intensive inter-
action with other legal disciplines. The cause lies in factors of a socia-eco-
nomic nature. Particularly important are the developments which a,re going
on in the field of the regulation of mobility of people and in the develop-
ments in the law on residence, Nationality Law and Social security law
regarding claims made by foreigners based on their family relationships.
The meaning of the above for jnrists is on the one hand that PIL jurists
are being tempted more than ever before to come out of their ivory tower,
and that jurists from other fields are being tempted to delve deeper into
problems of PIL nature. Moreover, the recognition of this hinge position
and the economic impact of IFL makes it conceivable that many policy
makers become attracted to applying IFL rules in such a manner that the
economic interests that they strive to achieve are best served. I shall go
into these socio-economic components of IFL in this paper; specifically in
the light of current developments to europeanise it.
III. - THE EFFECT OF RECOGNITION
ON THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPONENT
OF INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW: DEVELOPMENT
OF A TWO PRONGED POLICY
Earlier on, I indicated the possible impact of economic policy decisions
on the way IFL is treated in present Dutch national policy. (8) In partic-
ular I indicated developments in the Netherlands which tend to have a
restrictive way of treating IFL, through restrictive migration policy. In
(8) See the references made infra, footnote 10. I also indicated already earlier (V. VAN DEN
EEOKHOUT, "Gelijkheid in het intemationaal privaatrecht. Een kritiek op gangbare structurering
van het debat", Nemesis 2003, p. 177-189) on the "ideological defilement" of IFL; ideologies
that are connected with a restrictive integration and immigration policy let their effects be felt
on developments within IFL, as I argued there. I assumed that current developments in IFL
are to a large extent parallel with general social-legal developments, and I illustrated this with
the manner in which in PIL the goal of equal treatment of men and women is being achieved.
Indeed, the fact that policy makers and practitioners of IFL Jive in that same society will
undoubtedly contribute to "socialise" IFL. What is dangerous, I argued, is when "cultural" and
"gender equality" arguments are used in a veiling way. This happens, in particular, where claims
are evaluated by authorities as being purely situated in a context of clashing of cultures, but
where in actual fact government priorities for migration are being aided.
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those publications I also pointed out that in a European context the ten-
dency is to move in an opposite direction with regards to IFL, through
opposite economical practises. Recognition of the social-economic impact
of IFL leads, apparently in this sense, to the current development of a
"two track policy." Due to the fact that policy is made on two levels,
namely on European level and on a national (Dutch) level, the two track
policy is one that compares developments on a national (Dutch) level and
on a supranational European one. But because their work is limited to
their own particular areas, one would be better off speaking of a situation
of "bi-polarity." As I will point out later, the future may well point to a
true two track policy system within only one level, if the ED will deal
with "extracommunitarian" cases and, in this context, takes over the ten-
dencies prevalent in the national context.
Hereafter, I shall firstly briefly remind and describe some of the devel-
opments on the national level. The problems and questions that arise from
this are primarily meant to be used as reference points in the later discus-
sion on what kind developments are occurring on European level. So I shall
start with the Dutch experiences and then move on to the European con-
text where I will firstly look at the intra-communitarian context and then
the legal relationships that include an external aspect.
IlL!. - Ourrent developments
on a Dutch national level
IlL!.!. Ways to cope with I nternational Family Law in a restrictive sense
One should not overestimate the phenomenon of the impact of economic
concerns on the way IFL is looked at in the Netherlands, but, however, the
general tendency seems clear to me : in a Dutch context where questions
arise about claims with regards to the laws on residence and nationality as
well as Social Law for non-ED foreigners, the Dutch authorities look at
IFL very restrictively. (9) Sometimes these authorities even almost com-
pletely ignore IFL in order to stop a foreigners claims coming to fruition
in the above fields. (10) Thus, a manipulation takes place of IFL; a manip-
(9) By restrictively I mean that IFL is used to stop claims rather than aid them.
(10) In earlier publications, I started the analysis of these developments. See V. VAN DEN
EEOKHOUT, "Voetangels bij p1eidooien voor recht op respect voor cu1turele diversiteit", in
P.B. CLITEUR en V. VAN DEN EEOKHOUT (red.), Multiculturalisme, cultuurrelativisme en sociale
cohesie, Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2001, pp. 363-382; V. VAN DEN EEOKHOUT, Inter-
nationaal privaatrecht en migratierecht. De evol1ttie van een tweesporenbeleid, Nemesis 2002, pp. 75-
88; V. VAN DEN EEOKHOUT, "De vermaatschappelijking van het internationaal privaatrecht.
Ontwikkelingen aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw", Migrantenrecht 2002, pp. 144-158 and V. VAN
DEN EEOKHOUT, "Gelijkheid in het internationaal privaatrecht. Een kritiek op de gangbare
structurering van het debat", l.c. Recently also P. BOELEs, Mensen &Papieren. Legalisatie en
verificatie van b1titenlandse doC1tmenten 1tit "probleemlanden", Utrecht: Forum 2003." BOELEs
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ulation in the sense of development of rules of IFL and use of margins
within IFL in a "negative" manner (11), included manipulation in the sense
of ignoring of IFL rules. (12)
It is true that Dutch IFL as such - oertainly in the areas of marriage
and divoroe - is traditionally fairly "liberal" in the sense that it is strongly
"favor matrimonii" and "favor divortii" based. But this obvious "favor-
inolination" must be strongly re-examined: Firstly, IFL itself sometimes
already infringes on the so-called "liberalism", because of the pressure of
restriotive migration policies - see for instanoe the ohanges made to
artiole 4 Aot "Wet Conflictenrecht Huwelijk" : here the legality of consular
marriages has been limited so as to prevent false marriages. (13) Recent leg-
islation in the area of the International Lineage Law and International
Adoption Law has the spirit of liberalism, but has felt the same pressures
from migration policies. (14)
makes a critical and detailed analysis of the most important legal aspects with relation to legis-
lation and vel'ification of documents. The authol' comes to the conclusion that the Dutch "Iegal-
isation" policy contmdicts intemational obligations and Dutch laws on PIL. In policies regard-
ing "problem countries" the use of PIL is virtually non-existent.
(11) PIL doctrine on "renvoi", "preliminal'Y question", "substitution", "adaptation", "quali-
fication" can function as a cmtain behind which PIL is instrumentally used. See ERAUW, J. "De
ambtenaal' van de burgerlijke stand en dat rare internationaal privaatrecht", De Bnrgerlijl,e
Stand 1986, (69), 69, and about the strategic possibilities that the PIL offel's V. VAN DEN EECK-
HaUl', "Review of M.-Cl. Fobets, "Les families maglll'llbines et la justice en Belgique. Anthropol-
ogie juridique et immigration", TijdscMift voor Privaatrecht 1995, pp. 389-394. See also for a spe-
cific type of interaction between PIL and Migration law in a negative sense M. VAN DER LINDE
en S. VAN WALSUM, "De problematiek van zwarte en migrantenvrouwen", in A. HERINGA (red.),
Het vronwenverdrag: een beeld van een verdrag, Antwerpen: Maklu 1994, p. 293,
(12) See what is mentioned in footnote 10. As BOELES indicates briefly, certain practices of
manipulation of IFL aTe also visible in Social Security Law, in particular with the former prac-
tice in Social Security Law in relation to the value that is given to foreign judicial decisions by
which a date of birth is changed. See also ~ and this is more recent in Social Security Law - the
practice concerning the definition of the notion "own child" in article 7 Act on Child benefit
("AKW") : here too one can see the ignoring of PIL rules. Instead of using PIL one sees the
material legal judgment of the situation created abroad. Further information about this ca,n be
found in V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "Uw kinderen zijn uw Idnderen niet ... in de zin van artikel7
AKW", Tijdschrift voor F'amilie- en Jeugdrecht 2001, pp. 171-176 and G. VONK and Y. YDEMA-
GUTJAHR, "Over de invloed van buitenlandse culturele waarden op de juridische normering in
de sociale zekerheid", in N. VAN MANEN (red.), De m1tlticnltnrele samenleving en het recht,
Nijrnegen: Ars Aequi Libri 2002, pp. 357-368. The judicial descision with which these practices
came into being, according to Vonk and Gutjahr, was in the judgement of the Centrale Raad
van Beroep of 23 December 1987 (RSV 1988/168). But in fact, in this judgement the CRvB in
a way accorded a second chance by looking at the substantive law.
(13) See VAN DEN EEOKHOUT, "Internationaal privaatrecht en migratierecht. De evolutie van
een tweesporenbeleid", 1.c.
(14) See for the inclusion of this in PIL rules: article 9 paragraph 1 under b of the New Act
containing choice of law rules with regard to lineage and the recognition thereof ("Wet Con-
flictenrecht Afstamming") (law of 14 March 2002 that took effect on 1 May 2003). This WCA
is at a first glanee fairly liberal concerning the recognition of judicial decisions, legal facts and
legal transactions. But what is interesting is that next to the general demand that the foreign
judicial decisions having respected principles of due process, article 9 paragraph 1 under b states
that a decision must be made "after a pl'Oper investigation has taken place". See about this
L. JORDENS-COTRAN, "De wet conflictenrecht afstamming", Burgerzaken en recht 2002, pp. 261-
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A less "liberal" image also appears if one looks at how IFL works in
connection with other legal domains: occasionally IFL, and the hon-
oured favor-principle, is left alone, but the IFL honoured liberalism gets
degenerated afterwards: a liberal IFL regulation can, after all, remain
useless when no attention is paid to the outcome of IFL disputes in
other legal areas. (15) Also it happens that liberalising tendencies in IFL
are edged on even stronger when a liberal IFL regulation in its effect on
another area of the law is negative for those concerned. (16)
In such situations it often seems as though IFL rules are simply left aside
and that margins are used just to ensure a negative result for those who
claim rights. Apparently negative consequences for foreigners in migration
law can be reached by using IFL in a certain way. All this certainly raises a
number of fundamental questions that I shall briefly go into below.
III. 1.2. A search for consistency, legitimacy and, in general, questions on
the positioning of PIL
The instrumental use of PIL and the treatment within PIL of certain PIL
principles threatens consistency in the field: if one keeps playing with the rules
in order to reach a satisfactory outcome for government authorities, then this
will inevitably result in an arbitrary and inconsistent use of PIL rules. (17)
267 en 296-303, specifically p. 302, note 117, where she states that this goes much further than is
common use in IFL, given the fact that apparently recognition can only take place if the judicial
decision is based on trustworthy facts. PIL thus seems to be affected with having to go too far in
examining documents. For the latter in a different context see P.B. BOELES, a.c. Also articlelO,
paragraph 2, under c Wet Conflictenrecht Afstamming concerning the "sham recognitions" and
similarly article 6 paragraph 3 of the recent Wet Conflictenrecht Adoptie (in which it is stated that
acknowledgment of an adoption can be withheld in the interest of public order, when it is an adop-
tion that has taken place for appearances to trick the system). Incidentally, this goes against the
advice of a government Commission on PIL (advice 16 October 2000) that warned against using
PIL for the law on foreigners and nationality issues; cfr. also, mutatis mutandis, with relation to
stopping sham marriages, (the advice of 1 May 1977 about the Ontwerp Rijkswet Nederlander-
schap). The legislator held that a ground for refusal could be upheld if it was based on sham adop-
tion or sham marriage. For further reading: V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "De vermaatschappelijking
van het internationaal privaatrecht. Ontwikkelingen aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw", I.e.
(15) For example if the (liberal) recognition of a lineage relationship that has been established abroad
is denied to have consequences in a nationality, residential or social legal sense (this I pointed out in V.
VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "De vermaatschappelijking van het internationaal privaatrecht. Ontwikkelingen
aan het begin van de 2.1ste eeuw", with the example of the changing of article 4 Rijkswet Nederlander-
schap). Or, for example, if IFL is left aside in the judgement of public legal claims as is done by the
Dutch Centrale Raad van Beroep in cases concerning child benefit. (see supra, footnote 12).
(16) See my contribution in Migrantenrecht for examples on marriage and Uneage. See also
infra, footnote 24 L. JORDENS-COTRAN.
(17) The same sort of criticisms could be applied to these practices, as mutatis mutandis,
Th. Spijkerboer formulated in his speech on the functioning of the Dutch Raad van State
(T.P. SPIJKERBOER, Ret hager beraep in vreemdelingenzaken,'s Gravenhage Sdu 2002). For a book
review of Spijkerboer, see P. BOELES, RM Themis April 2003, pp. 90-93, where he goes into the
violation of Human Rights that are central to the discussion. One could say, mutatis mutandis,
that fundamental Human Rights - e.g. the right to have family life respected and the non-discrim-
ination principle - could be violated here along a specific usage of PIL rules. See also infra, 4.2.4.
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Questions that arise are how far the rules of PIL may be bent, in which
manner and with which arguments they can be filled in, and whether there
are certain reasons and situations when the entire field of PIL should be
used or not. (18) The answer to these questions needs a certain amount of
contemplation about IPL techniques, about consistency within PIL and
between the field of PIL and fields such as Social Security Law, National-
ity Law and laws on residence. More fundamentally though is the question
whether PIL should be allowed to be influenced by political policy aims
that are prevalent in other fields. Can it be justified to use PIL for migra-
tion purposes or to use certain aspects of migration as arguments within
PIL? In actual fact, the question that remains is whether PIL should link
up with developments in the field of migration (19) or whether it should try
to stand ground and even put up a fight. (20) A third option, PIL could
be that PIL would develop completely independently. (21)
Whoever asks questions about the positioning of PIL, about (in) consi-
stencies in the way governmental authorities use IFL and the legitimacy
of methods being used, must answer questions on a variety of levels. For
example, a comparison can be made between the use of IFL within Nation-
ality Law, Social Security Law and the laws on residence (22): are IFL
(IS) The issues brought up here are also applicable in the defining of margins in (Dutch) mate-
rial Family Law, as substantive Dutch Family Law includes margins that can be filled in dif-
ferently in different cases under influence of considerations of migration law. These margins
include, for example, concepts as the interest of the child, the interdiction of marriage on the
basis of "lineage", the "permanent breakdown" of the marriage, the possibility to allow minors
to marry if "serious reasons" are present ...
(19) See for example supra, footnote 13.
(20) For example when PIL is interpreted as being an instrument that aims to simplify inter-
national legal traffic. In my contribution in Nemesis I looked at the compatibility of PIL with
aims in Migration Law: I stated that the spirit of PIL goes against its usage to work against
rigbts to residence but the spirit is certainly compatible with PIL usage to increase mobility
of people - ail is happening recently in an ED context. Even though it is true that sometimes
reservations are made to the goal of simplifying legal traffic, I believe the goal of hampering
claims of residence as such cannot be a goal that should be taken into account in PIL. See
V. VAN DEN EEOKHOUT, "Internationaal privaatrecht en migratierecht. De evolutie van een
tweesporenbeleid", I.c. Also infra.
(21) If so, there is however a risk to be mentioned here (see also footnote 15) that PIL judicial
decisions will not take effect in other areas of the law. An intervention of less consequence (than
denying in an absolute way public claims based on family relations) in other areas of the law is
possibly the inclusion of rules concerning nationality and residence that at a later date has been
proven to be fraudulent, nationality and/or residence can be revoked (in other words, an inter-
vention in other areas of the law takes place in order to lessen the pressure in a particular area
of PIL, but at the same time international legal relationships do have effect in the public legal
sphere. See in this context for developments in Dutch Nationality legislation, critically from the
perspective of the consequences for children (not dealing with issues of PILl. S. SARI, "Her-
roeping van het Nederlanderschap wegens bedrog en gevolgen voor de kinderen", .ft1igrantenrecht
2003, pp. 325-331.
(22) With where at all possible comparative l'esearch, for example into German practice con-
ceming international family legal relationships within Social Security Law (this German practice
is also mentioned by Vonk and Ydema-Gutjahr (I.c.) in their discussions about the way in which
the Dutch Centrale Raad voor Beroep currently judges.
518 VEERLE VAN DEN EECKHOUT
questions answered differently if they arise within laws on residence, Social
Security Law or Nationality Law 1 Will PIL be used within a field and not
in others? (23) Are there even examples of a difference in usage within one
field and in a confrontation with the same family relationship when the
answer to the questions posed in one case is advantageous for a govern-
ment authority and in the other circumstance is not? (24)
Such an exhaustive analysis of Dutch PIL has not yet been done,
although in earlier papers I did a small amount of research into this area.
After these first steps in research into the current methods, I believe that
I can conclude that in practise Dutch PIL is currently developing in all
directions, though in general it is clear - to my regret - that it is evolving
in a restrictive sense.
I do not want to say here that there are no circumstances in which jus-
tification of different usage of PIL rules exists. (25) Only, currently, no con-
vincing justifications are given for the different usage, but if a different
usage occurs then it should be justified, visible inconsistencies should be
underpinned with clear argumentation and the practice should be seen in
the light of human rights that are either being respected or are being
infringed upon throughout. (26)
At this moment in time there has not been such a systematic and clear
analysis. The only consistency that I have found until now is the manner
in which PIL is used - even if there may well be exceptions -is almost
always bad for the people involved.
(23) See also the points made by Vonk and Ydema-Gutjahr (I.e.) about the different usage of
PIL rules in Social Security Law.
(24) For this see for example the opinion of L. JORDENS-COTRAN at the conference "Informele
buitenlandse huwelijken en het Nederlandse recht" on 13 March 2003 organised by Register
Amsterdam about the practise of recognising informal marriages in cases of child benefit on the
one hand and pension payments on the other hand. Informal marriages seem to be recognised
by luck of the draw, albeit that almost always the possibilities to claim social rights are nega-
tively influenced by the proceedings. Thc rcgistcring in the Basic Local Administrative Registry
(GBA) and legalisation are done on a arbitrary basis (roOl'e about the role of registration of mar-
riages in the GBA, E. GUBBELS, "Inschrijving huwelijk in het buitenland met een
minderjarige?", B1trgerzaken en recht 2002, pp. 147-150). In earlier jurisprudence it looked as
though the (non-) recognition of informal marriages would get a positive surge for those involved
in the proceedings (see for this the judicial decisions noted by L. JORDENS-COTRAN, "Huwelijks-
bevestiging in het Marokkaanse en Nederlandse recht", Recht van de islam 1999, pp. 83-131, par-
ticularly p. 121). In this case a U-turn seems to have been made in the last couple of years.
(25) In the sense that recognition of a family legal relationship within PIL could still result
in non-recognition of a family relationship in other areas of the law, but also that non-recogni-
tion of a family legal relationship within PIL does not have to stand in the way of recognition
of family relationships in other areas of law. See also V. V~" DEN EEOKHOUT, "De vermaat-
schappelijking van het internationaal privaatrecht. Ontwikkelingen aan het begin van de
21ste eeuw", I.e., footnote 23: it could be possible that a family situation is not recognised as
such, but does result in the granting of certain legal rights.
(26) Is the right to experience a proper family life being hampered by the way in which dif-
ferent areas of the law react to one another?
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I believe it would be wrong to label the above usages and practices as
being part of the struggle to combat fraud and justify them in that way.
Or is it perhaps logical that other conditions apply, now and again, depen-
ding on what a certain foreigner is asking for? Is it logical that stricter con-
ditions are applied when a foreigner wishes to apply for certain advanta-
geous benefits? Should we be more lenient in allowing certain documents
to be used as evidence if the foreigner is at a disadvantage? (27) Could the
will to combat fraud be a justification so that in certain situations, ulti-
mately, the entire field of PIL is made applicable or not 1 In my point of
view, such kinds of justification are not acceptable. (28)
Naturally, it is possible to discuss on the way in which importance
should be attached to the interests of persons on the one hand and the
interests of authorities on the other. (29) However, it cannot be the case
that the interest of government authorities is being helped by the syste-
matic refusal of applications ~ in an inconsistent way. I shall leave this
area of aiding governmental interest and combating fraud aside. I do, how-
ever, wish to point out here briefly that the area of fraud raises a number
of serious questions about the positioning of PIL. The issue at hand is the
overwhelming fear of and perception of fraud: the perception that has
become very popular is that when claims of residence, on social security or
nationality are made by foreigners, one should be very vigilant against
abuses. It is said that mechanisms of control must be increased. It appears
that, in the discipline of IFL, too, the idea is spreading that IFL is being
put under pressure by attempts to abuse it, not solely to obtain advantages
in Family Law, (30) but also to obtain advantages in residence, on social
security and nationality. (31) Thus, a central question for research is how
IFL deals with - and should deal with - "fraud". Analysis of this requires
a fundamental study of what is understood in IFL by "fraud" - what is,
for example, the difference between "shopping" and "fraud" (32). It also
(27) It seems e.g. as though there is a diffm'ence in the manner in which the requirement of
legalisation for a certificate of marriage for l'ecognition is handled, or in the manner in which
the legalisation of a certificate of birth is used as a l'equirement for child benefit.
(28) See for a fundamental Cl'iticism in the context of "legalisation", P.B. BOELES, O.C.
(29) If one wanted to shape the result of government interest in the public legal domain, then
wouldn't there have to be consisteucy in the manner in which PIL is used in, for example rela-
tion to nationality laws on the one hand, in relation to social security laws ou the other hand?
Or within on area of the law - for example, if one has an own family legal definition within social
security laws, then one would want it to be the same for marriages as well as succession matters,
or not 1
(30) For example, a,ttempts to facilitate a divorce through manipulation of IFL.
(31)For example, through sham marriages, sham adoptions, ... See, e.g., J. ERAUW, "De cod-
ificatie van het Belgisch internationaal privaatrecht met het ontwerp van wetboek I.P.R.",
Rechtsknndig Weekblad 2002, p. 1557.
(32) See in this context also V. VAN DEN EEoKHouT, "De wisselwerking tussen materieel recht
en internationaal privaatrecht: eenrichtings- of tweerichtingsverkeer 1", Rechtsknndig Weekblad
1999-2000, p. 1249-1265.
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requires determination of the extent to which IFL is concerned with the
fact that people sometimes try to influence claims in areas outside Family
Law through management of IFL techniques. This part of the analysis
should focus on how the policy of combating fraud affects the way IFL
rules are promulgated and applied. Here, the following issues would be
tackled: should more techniques be developed in IFL itself - e.g. through
elaboration of the "exception of international public order" (33) 1 Or should
the discipline of IFL be left undisturbed 1 (34) Can alternative ways of com-
bating fraud be found, through intervention at a preliminary stage or post-
IFL 1 (35) What are the advantages and disadvantages of each of these
options, as viewed from the perspective of IFL 1 (36) In such an analysis,
special attention should be paid to the theme of family formation and fam-
ily reunification: these are issues which were at first presented as needing
attention only as a way of combating "fraud", and then over time made
the focus of an open policy of discouragement, regardless of whether fraud
had been perpetrated or not.
III. 1.3. Implicit economic dist1'ess
As mentioned earlier, everything still seems m an embryonic stage and
one can therefore only speak of incidental usage of IFL in a restrictive
(33) See also about the possibility of forming the "reality test" in such a manner as to ensure
that a person can only gain access to a family legal institute if certain conditions are met regar-
ding issues of residence, V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "Internationaal privaatrecht en migratierecht.
De evolutie van een tweesporenbeleid", I.c. See also supra about sham marriages, sham adoptions
and sham recognition's.
(34) Perhaps because the discipline of IFL has to be considered too "soft"to combat fraud?
If so, can this supposed inadequacy to combat fraud be used to justify the whole discipline of
IFL being by-passed in certain areas? For a critical analysis in this context, see P.B. BOELEs,
o.c., who refers to several practices in which IFL rules are not respected, even outside the area
of legalisation. Historically see H.U. Jessurun D'OLIVEIRA, "Kromme rectificaties", Ars Aeq1Li
1983, pp. 663-673 concerning recognition of foreign judicial decisions where a date of birth is
changed. In the judgment of the tribunal of Amsterdam, 4 October 1996 (in the procedure pre-
liminary to the judgement of the CRvB, 7 April 1999), the tribunal explicitly refered to the fac-
tor of "fraud" to put aside rules of PIL, arguing also that in doing this way, a "fair" way of
handling could be reached. See however, for a critical analysis of the unfair result of handling
this way, V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "Uw kinderen zijn uw lrinderen niet ... in de zin van artikel
7 AKW", I.c. It is worth mentioning that in CRvB Utrecht, 14 January 1998, confronted with
a..."Spanish adoption", one party tried - in vain - to argue on the basis of article 3, first para-
graph of Regulation 1408/71, containing an interdiction on discrimination on the basis of nation-
ality.
(35) Regarding an attempt to intervene in the phase before PIL, see historically, the original
Dutch legislative suggestion about registered partnerships, with criticism from H.U. Jessurun
D'OLIVEIRA, "Geregistreerde partnerschappen en de Europese Unie. Kanttekeningen over de
internationale reikwijdte van het wetsvoorstel", N.J.B. 1995, 1566-1570.
(36) It is conceivable that a comparison of the pros and cons will ultimately result in criticism
of the intensity of the battle against fraud as such, and thus will not be limited to the pure
expression of a preference between different ways of combating fraud. For a critical view of the
tendency to increase control mechanisms, see also K. GROENENDIJK and R. BARZILAY, Verzwak-
king van de rechtspositie van toegelaten vreemdeUngen, Utrecht: Forum 2001.
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sense. Moreover, much seems to happen in a "veiled" manner; as far as I
can see IFL has never been earmarked in a general way as a method for
aiding a restrictive migration policy. Due partly to the fact that the eco-
nomic arguments remain disguised, certain practises and phenomena's have
not yet been discussed; but discussed they must be. Discussions must be
done with a field of research where the margins are sufficiently wide-
placed. (37)
Discussion is certainly also necessary in anticipation of European inter-
vention in areas that are momentarily non-European. Especially as, and I
shall go into this further on, in a European context PIL is explicitly used
as a key to economic considerations. (38)
Seen from this perspective, the central question to answer will be to what
extent the ED will try in future to interfere in PIL aspects of international
legal relationships that have "external" aspects. And a follow-up question
is how the socio-economic aims in that context shall be balanced. Put this
way, it is particularly interesting to monitor the current and future deve-
lopments in a European context.
III.2. ~ A new actol': the EU
III.2.1. New inteljerences from an unexpected angle
Fairly unexpectedly a new actor has entered the domain of IFL
regulation; an actor on a supranational level that traditionally has acted
(37) At the moment one can speak of a double development in two senses - and attention
must be paid to both developments: where non-European foreigners are concerned, two
situations can be seen that both but them at a disadvantage. On the one hand (and this is
not only prevalent in the Netherlands, but also in other EU member states) there is a ten-
dency to hamper consequences of family life in terms of nationality, residence and social secu-
rity (for a critical piece on this hampering of nationality consequences: G.-R. DE GROOT,
"Verder op weg naar een hernieuwd nationaliteitsrecht. Bespreking wijzigingsnota Rijkswet
Nederlanderschap", Migrantenrecht 1999, p. 15 e,v.). On the other hand there is a tendency
to restrictively deal with IFL rules in order to create a discouraging migration policy -
instrumental use in other words of IFL rules - for example by neglecting without proper jus-
tification of IFL rules (see the manner in which IFL rules are used regarding child benefit)
through the working in IFL of problems within the law on foreigners through a misunder-
standing of the achievements and basic principles of IFL (see the new Wet Conflictenrecht
Afstamming) ...
(38) It has though to be noted immediately that this instrumentation of IFL (or even more
of substantive Family Law) for economic reasons has already been strongly criticised. See for
recent discussions on this matter K. BOELE-WOELKI (red.), Perspectives for the unification and
harmonisation of Family Law in Europe, Antwerpen: Intersentia 2003, particularly
M, JANTERA-JAREBORG, "Unification of international family law in Europe - a critical per-
spective" in K. BOELE-WOELKI (red.), P"'spectives for the unification and harmonisation of
fa,mily law in Europe, Antwerpen: Intersentia 2003, pp. 194-216, especially p. 211,
footnote 45 and W, PIN'rENs, "Europeanisation of family law", in K. BOELE-WOELKI (red.),
Perspectives for the unification and harmonisation of family law in Europe, Antwerpen:
Intersentia 2003, pp. 3-29.
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almost entirely for economic reasons and with economic motives. (39)
Indeed, it is known that the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam substantially and
controversially changed the EC Treaty, and the changes that affected the
field of PIL are known as "the Europeanisation of PIL." This phenomenon
of Europeanisation of PIL can be seen as a process whereby the ED has
given itself powers to create PIL rules, through the new article 65 in the
EC Treaty. This concerns procedural law (jurisdiction on the one hand and
recognition and enforcement on the other) as well as rules of applicable
law - in short all PIL traits.
In the last couple of years, it was not expected that this would happen,
certainly not concerning the sub-discipline of IFL. A confrontation with
the difficulties of (International) Family Law did naturally exist, but the
european authorities always took a restrictive stance. (40) Of course there
are family legal terminologies in EC Law, but in the past, family legal mat-
ters in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice were very inci-
dental and of a subsidiary nature. The ECJ did, for example, come with a
verdict on the legitimacy of foreign judicial decisions whereby a date of
birth was rectified, in matters of rules on name, or in matters of alimenta-
tion. But in the case of family legal terminologies that are central to EC
Regulations and Directives, Co-operation Treaties, etc the ECJ has tradi-
tionally been rather reserved in any interference in (International) Family
Law of member states. The European Court of Justice has thus acted sub-
dued with regards to IFL of member states, also in cases such as European
legislation whereby family members of ED employees made use of the right
of residence, or in similar cases where legislation was applicable through co-
operation or association treaties that gave social and economic advantages
to those involved. (41) What was particularly distressing, was the promul-
gation of legislation in this area by European institutions themselves.
(39) Eventhough the ED is loosing its purely economic character and goals, and is now also
working in areas such as Human Rights, it is still a fact that the ED is primarily inspired by
economic motives. See on this the Draft Council Report 13017/01 on the need to approximate
Member States' legislation in civil matters of October 29t h, 2001, adopted at November 16th 2001.
(40) See A.V.M. STRUYCKEN, "Les consequences de l'integration europeenne", Recueil des Cours,
1992-1, p. 307-8 and pp. 351-358 and ROTH, "Der Einflus des Europai'schen Gemeinschaftsrechts
auf das 1nternationale Privatrecht", RabelsZ 1991, pp. 634-636. See also recently, but briefly, on
this issue K. SIEHR, "Family unions in private international law", N.I.L.R. 2003, pp. 419-435.
(41) See particularly Diatta (Case 267/83 (1985) ECR 567, Reed (Case 59/5, (1986) ECR 1283)
and Singh (C-370 +90 (1992) ECR 1-4265). Also European Court of Justice, 5 February 1981,
N.J., note Schultz and the decision Johannes (see for comments on this last judicial decision:
S. FRANCQ, "Droit civil, droit familial et droit international prive : un cocktail qui plait peu it la
Cour. Decision de la CJCE du 10 juin 1999", ZEUP 3/2002, pp. 597-610; F. RIGAUX ("Ver-
sorgungsausgleich" and art. 12 EC: discrimination based on nationality and German private
international law", Iprax 2000, pp. 287-288. Rigaux talks about the disinterest. of the Court of
Justice) and M. TRAEST, "Internationaal privaatrecht inzake echtscheiding discriminatoir1", note
attached to ECJ, 10 June 1999, Johannes t. Johannes, nr. C-340/97, Algemeen J~tridi8ch Tijd-
schrift, 1999-2000, pp. 619-624. Regarding the Johannes-judgement, see also infra, footnote 82.
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The Treaty of Amsterdam changed all this. European institutions want
to interfere substantially in the field of IFL. It is clear that, in previous
years, European institutions have been creating ambitious plans for a uni-
fication of IFL, or, even better, the ED has been Joc1Msing on unification
of IFL - see the Action Plan (42) and the Draft Programme. (43) Obviously
the ED sees itself as being largely responsible for unification of IFL rules.
The justiJication for this is less clear and needs clarification (44): it is
unclear whether policy makers at the creation of the Treaty of Amsterdam
intended to intervene from the beginning in IFL as sub-discipline of PIL
and from which perspective and angle one actually wanted to intervene
from. For example, is the real goal, the completion of freedom of movement
of persons or the freedom of movement of judicial decisions - and what is
the relation between both 1
III.2.2. Why is there EU interference in International Family La.w: two
visions?
In my point of view there are two possible visions on the Europeanisation
of IFL. Even if the policy makers did not have one of those visions as pos-
sible explanations for ED interventions from the beginning, the presentation
of the visions could of course still give us justification afterwards as well as
a further insight into the development of the process of Europeanisation of
IFL. In other words, the matter of explaining the justification of ED inter-
ference may seem academic but could also give us clarification about the
manner in which unification could be best developed, and answer the ques-
tion whether a unification of rules of PIL is enough or whether there should
also be unification regarding the rules of substantive Family Law and/or a
unification of the rules in the field of Public Law. Thus, a clear vision of the
why about the process of Europeanisation, regarding possible justification of
which matters that fall within ED responsibility, is important. (45) In short
(42) Vienna Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the
provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice - Text
adopted by the Justice and Horne Affairs Council of 3 December 1998, O.J., COI9, 23/01/1999
pp.0001-0015.
(43) Draft programme of measures for implementation of the principle of mutual recognition
of decisions in civil and commercial matters, O.J., COI2, 15.01.2001, pp. 0001-0009. In Tampere
the European Council asked for the implementation of a programme for mutual recognition. Con-
cerning IFL especially - and in particular on alimentation and authority - the draft text wishes
to see a greater advance.
(44) See also for a discussion about this with more references O. REMJEN, "European Private
International Law, the European community and its emerging al'ea of freedom, security and jus-
tice", GMLR 2001, pp. 53-86, particularly p. 74 where he states "Family Law has ever been named
as 'Ie vecteur essentiel' for the European judicial area". See also on this point M. TRAEST, D.C.
(45) On the one hand it is about which areas of Family Law can be regulated (specifically:
can it be just "matters of status" or also wider family legal matters) and on the other hand the
question about which PIL domains can be regulated (all the PIL questions or not).
524 VEERLE V AN DEN EECKHOUT
any clarification of the above can give us a valuable insight into the devel-
opment of the unification process and give us the direction in which the ED
will move.
III.2.2.a. "Free movement of persons and an area of freedom, security and
justice" (46)
The key question is how exactly IFL is related to the ED. (47) If one
attempts to answer this question then one will inevitably see that the
authority to interfere with PIL is regulated in the new Title IV of the EC
Treaty with the title: "Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies
related to free movement of persons". Even though it may not have been
the direct intention of having PIL placed in the EC Treaty in this way, the
place in which these powers are summed up in the Treaty could be relevant
for further augmentation of ED interference in IFL. (48)
It is interesting to notice that up till now only one of the list of aspects
of "Migration Law" in Title IV has been given serious attention, namely
that of "free movement" - as one of the fundamental freedoms of the EC
Treaty. Quite often it is stated that the aim is to get rid of differences in
legislation that hamper mobility of people, but it boils down to vague
pointers as to how exactly IFL is related to this fundamental freedom of
movement of persons.
III.2.2.b. The uniform definition of family legal terminology as a "prelim-
inary question" and/or the furtherance of legal security
In my point of view, if one really would like to point out the importance
of the freedom of movement of persons, there are two categories in which
arguments could fall ~ whereby, possibly, one could also think of a com-
bination of the two. The first category emphasises the stimulation of
mobility within the ED through the uniform filling-in of terms of family
law where they are relevant in ED law. The second category emphasises
the stimulation of the freedom of movement within Europe through an
increase in general legal security.
(46) See the terminology used in article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union and article
61 of the EO Treaty.
(47) Ooncerning questions about how the criterion of "necessity" is to be interpreted and
applied in the context of article 65, see, briefly, M. Tenreiro and M. Ekstrom, I.e. p. 185.
(48) Further on this (also sceptical), Struycken (Interview with MR. A.V.M. Struycken and
mI'. J.G.A. Struycken, AI'S Aequi 2001, p. 747) and O. Joustra, Mededelingen van de Nederlandse
Vereniging voor Internationaal recht, Verslag van de Algemene Vergadering 2003, p. 36. It is
interesting to note that authors such as Joustra argue for a disconnection of PIL on the one
hand and migration law on foreigners on the other in the EO Treaty, specifically through the
accommodation of the respective areas in different titles in the EO Treaty.
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Perhaps in drafting the Treaty of Amsterdam the primary idea was
defining "family member" in a uniform manner where this term is used
in European legislation. Thus, it becomes possible to argue that the EU
in Europeanising PIL primarily sought to Europeanise international
family law. But perhaps the aim,was to give the citizens a greater feeling
of legal security through legislating PIL rules in the field of PIL outside
IFL as well as IFL. Both categories have aspects of legal security, but
in the first category the importance of IFL as a cornerstone (IFL as a
link between the rules of Family Law and public legal claims) is evi-
dently visible, whereas this is not the case in the second category. I shall
explain below.
In the first category one can assume that the creators of Title IV were
trying to come to a uniform definition of family legal terminology in EU-
regulations regarding the freedom of movement of employees. The first
issue would then be the interpretation of the term "family members" in
Regulation 1612/68 - the Regulation on freedom of movement for wor-
kers within the Community. (49) The hypothesis in this category would
be the following: a uniform and liberal interpretation of IFL terminology
would stimulate greater usage of claims in the field of freedom of move-
ment. So a person married in accordance to the laws of one member state,
moving to another and falling under the provisions of the Regulation
1612/68 would not have to worry about the other states authorities not
recognising a partner as his husband or wife. In other words it is impor-
tant to ensure clarity concerning who, from an IFL angle, falls under the
provisions, as they are now formulated, where family members are
granted' a derived right of residence. The first thing that should then be
done is work on unification of rules of recognition. In this specific field
more legal security could certainly be achieved. It is also possible to go
a step further in this category by including family legal terms in legisla-
tion where the issues are not about the freedom of movement of persons,
but about social advantages, (50) claims granted via association trea-
(49) Similar to other regulations with regards to other categories that move within the EU
such as students and pensioners. Regarding the question whether the right to family reunion can
also be based on article 18 of the EO Treaty see the recent conclusion by Hacene AKRICH, no.
M .!tnd 106 with more references. See also in short infra footnote 132, the recent Garcia ~vello
case; where an explanation was given about the principles of Community Law in terms of citi-
zenship and freedom of movement of persons. See also in this context, the Proposal for a Direc-
tive on the right of Union Citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States.
(50) Regarding social advantages and the question who family members are that receive these
advantages; see G. BRINKMANN, "Family reunification of third-country nationals. Access of family
members to social protection benefits", European journal of migration and law 2002, pp. 291-308,
specifically pp. 292-293, where he states that "EC law does not recognize a single concept as to the
meaning offamily member for these purposes. As a matter of principle, it is for the Member States
to define who are the relatives of a third-country nationa.l or a. Union citizen exercising his/her mar-
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ties, (51) and so forth - perhaps even legislation coming from the Council
Directive of 22 September 2003 on the right of family reunification where
family legal terminology also exists. (52)
In the second category, however, the essence is about stimulating legal
security for those that have already been allowed to be mobile within
Europe. (53) The assumption here is that a unification of regulations of IFL
on a liberal basis will stimulate claims regarding free movement within
Europe, or at least shall remove any obstacles to that effect: if this is real-
ised, people will be more able to know what they can expect in circum-
stances of internationalisation of their legal relationship by exerting their
right to freedom of movement; at any rate they can rely upon the fact that
they shall not lose any family legal claims by moving freely within Europe.
In this category it is easier for one to distance oneself from the limitations
to unify regulations regarding family legal terminology that appear within
EC Law and of limitations in regulating problems concerning recognition.
Rather than focussing on problems regarding a derived right of residence
ket freedoms provided that such definition cannot be regarded as an obstacle to said freedom.
Although the meaning of family members has been specified in secondary Community legislation,
such as Article 10 of Directive 1612/68, it, however, refers to the circle of family members enti-
tled to family reunification but not to entitlement of family members to social protection bene-
fits" .
(51) See in this context Groenendijk, note in the Baumbast Case (Baumbast and R. 2002-09-
17 C-413/99, JV 2002/466), where Groenendijk argues that regarding a decision by the Court of
Justice on family reunion, article 10 of 1612/68 does not limit itself to the mutual children, but
also children of one of the parents - such as the daughter of Baumbast. Groenendijk bases his
arguments on the fact that the ECJ bases its decision on the aim of the regulation - the wife
would be hindered in joining a future husband if she would have to leave a daughter behind to
do so. Then he points out that this will also have consequences for those that fall under the pro-
visions of association treaties. Such a question is already centre of proceedings regarding article
7 Decision 1/180 of the Association Council EEC-Turkey (case C-275/02, Ayaz, PbEG 2002,
C261/2). Can then be argued that mutatis mutandis P1L rules must also fall in line and be treated
in a consistent way?
(52) Council Directive 2003/S6/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right of family reunification,
O.J., L251, 3 October 2003, pp. 0012-0018. For an analysis of terms of family law in European
legislation, see M. BELL, "We are family? Same-sex partners and EU migration law", Maastricht
Journal of European and Oomparative law, 2002, pp. 335-355.
(53) About the differences and interactions between being allowed to be mobile or to be resident
(in an EU member state where one would like to migrate to, another EU-member state that one
has migrated to in the first instance, or the home country of one's partner) : see ECJ Singh (C-370/
90 (1992) ECR 1-4265), and see also the recent judicial decision in Hacene Akrich (C-I09/01 2003-
09-23) and the conclusion of the advocate-general in this case, particularly no. 123. See, critically,
on Hacene AKRICH, comments of CAG, JV 2004/1, also refering to the "Chen-case" (C-200/02, OJ.,
2002 CIS0, p. 12, to be expected) and recent developments in legislation concerning right of free-
dom of mobility and residence of citizens of Union and their family members. See also the Council
Common Position of 5 December 2003 on the proposed Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside
freely within the territory ofthe Member Sttes (see http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/
doc3entre/citizenship/movement/doc_citizenship_movement_en.htm; in March 2004, this Directive
on the right of citizens of the EU and their families to freely move and reside within the territory
of the Union has been adopted by the European Parliament)), not introducing a preliminary con-
dition of residence.
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for family members of a ED employee, the second category is far wider and
aims to stimulate mobility through the creation of a climate of legal secu-
,rity in the area of family law. The idea is that people will be more reserved
in moving from one member state to another, if they are afraid of losing
claims by immigrating, or if simply they do not know what changes in their
. legal position they can expect on a family legal basis. Included in the latter
is the matter of what Law is applicable regarding their family relationship
and. which authorities can be addressed, and finally what value a judicial
decision has in another country. (54) As far as this category is more direct
,than the first regarding the three PIL questions, (55) one can say that this
category can justify in a greater manner the unification of rules of IFL,
though in this category, more than in the first, the goal of reaching a uni-
fication of rules of IFL in an intra-communitarian context becomes
clear. (56) However, additionally, one can surely say that it is a possibility
that work will be made of legal security also regarding the applicability of
association treaties, the Directive on the right of family reunification etc.
III.2.2.c. Possible conclusions from the Brussels II Regulation?
The first piece of ED unification in the field of IFL - the Brussels II
Regulation - can still be explained in two ways and can support the two
categories mentioned above. This is because Brussels II fits in with the
second category in the sense that it is favourable to the encouragement of
mutual recognition, within the ED, of judicial decisions on divorce and
(54) In this sense one is creating, for example, liberal rules. being a guarantee for "liberal
access to justice." Regarding the question on whether one could limit oneself to unifying PIL
rules see for example K. BOELE-WoELKI. "Divorce in Europe: unification of private interna-
tional law and harmonisation of substantive law". in H.F.G. LEMAIRE en P. VLAS (red.), Met
recht verkregen : Bundel opstellen aangeboden aan mr. Ingrid S. JOPPE. Deventer: Kluwer 2002.
pp. 17-28. It is possible that from this perspective a push could even be made for unifying claims
on a public legal basis (here it could be stated immediately that "unification" in the area of
claims of public law based on family relations. could be elaborated in a double way: on the one
hand. one could think of unification in the sense of unification of the family-law-concepts used
in public law. on the other hand. one could think of unification in the sense of unification' of
claims of public law themselves).
(55) I should point out however immediately that although in the first category it is all about
the defining of family legal terminology, and from that possibly the aim of free movement of judi-
cial decisions - in other words, the focus is put on the unification of rules of l'ecognition and
enforcement - also within the first category it could still be argued that to achieve the aim of free-
dom of movement of judicial decisions, an unification of the rules of jurisdiction and applicable law
(the latter to 'stop "shopping") is necessary. Further information about the possibility and reality
of the unification of rules of applicable law in divorce, a study by the Asser-institute in 2002 (http :1
europa.eu.int/comm/justiceJlOme/doc_centre/civil/studies/doc_civil_studies_en.htm).
(56) See further about the question what matters shoud be unified. seen from the perspective
of increasing legal security and not losing rights if one moves from one country to another,
N. DETHLOFF. I.c. specifically on whether just IFL or also substantive Family Law should be uni-
fied. In this context. Dethloff makes a distinction between a loss of status or of family-law rela-
tionships on the one hand, a loss of the legal effects of a status or legal relationship on the other
hand.
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thus stimulates legal security. At the same time it fits in with the first
category: although the Brussels II Regulation explicitly enters into termi-
nation of marriage, this naturally influences the status of family members
with regards to laws on residence, albeit in a negative manner. (57) It also
paves the way for entering into a new marriage where a new partner
appears that must also be granted certain privileges through a derived
right of residence. (58)
If one looks at the way in which Brussels II came into existence, then
it seems to be pure luck that article 65 was used as the basis for the Reg-
ulation. (59) Following on from this, it is my opinion that Brussels II does
not contain anything conclusive.
A greater amount of evidence is the fact that the ED has let it be known
that PIL rules should be unified in the areas of Marital Property Law and
Law of Succession (60). These rules do not directly influence the status of a
family member based on a derived right of residence and are completely
separated from matters of residence. Therefore a link with the first category
is far fetched. But interference in these areas could lead to a greater legal
security for those that already have claims regarding the freedom of move-
ment. Therefore, it is my opinion that, the second category offers more sup-
port to the way in which the ED wishes to interfere in IFL. The Draft
Council Rapport of 29 October 2001 also seems to support this theory. (61)
(57) It is interesting to note that the EU is busy shoring-up the legal position of divorced
partners and widows/widowers of persons that used their right of freedom of movement. See Pro-
posal Oom (2001) 257 OJ., 0270E, 25.09.2001 on the right of Union Oitizens and their family
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, and the Oouncil
Oommon Position of 5 December 2003 (see S7tpra, footnote 53). For EOJ cases that already
moved in this direction: see DIATTA (267/83 (1985) EOR 567) and BAUMBAST (2002-09-170-413/
99).
(58) See also, rnutatis rnutandis, in a non-European context, for a recognition of the same link
my comments on the judicial decision by the Dutch Hoge Raad, HR 9 November 2001, V. VAN
DEN EECKHOUT, "Gelijkheid in het internationaal privaatrecht. Een kritiek op de gangbare
structurering van het debat", 1.c. : whether the gentleman could let his "second" wife come over
or not depended on whether a divorce would be recognised 01' not.
(59) See for example V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "Europees echtscheiden. Bevoegdheid en
erkenning van beslissingen op basis van de EG verordening 1347/2000", in H. VAN HOUTTE
en M. PERTEGAS-SENDER (red.), H et nie7twe Europese IPR: van verdrag naar verordening,
Antwerpen: Intersentia 2001, pp. 69-102.
(60) It is, for example, foreseen in the Draft programme that future legal instruments will be
drawn up on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to property rights
arising out separation between married and unmarried couples and to wills and successions.
Moreover, Brussels II itself also contains rules on parental responsibility - even in an extended
way in the new Brussels II Regulation. Here, it could be noticed however that residence claims
could be influenced by decisions on parental responsibility ...
(61) Specifically, no. 6 and no. 14. See supra, footnote 39. See also in general the reasons that
are presented to interfere with PIL, including issues of applicable law: see recently the Explan-
atory Memorandum with the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the
Oouncil on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations ("Rome II"), Oom (2003) 427(01),
focusing on legal security.
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.III.2.3. The tendency of liberalisation in an intra-communitarian context -
hotp far and in what sense?
c. III.2.3.a. Liberalisation of (International) Family Law
Asituation of legal security can be achieved that guarantees a mlIllmum
or maximum of claims and can therefore to a greater or lesser extent show
favour-tendencies. (62) It is interesting to see how things have been worked
out in Brussels II.
Looking at the manner in which the Brussels II Regulation has been for-
mulated, one can distil the following concerns: the promotion of the goal
of mobility through the increase in legal security, a legal security to be
realised by achieving a situation of international harmony. Once one has
been granted a divorce it will no longer be questioned, which ensures that
fU{y achievements made will not be lost by migrating within the ED; the
opposite case would hamper movement.
Through an examination of the Brussels II Regulation it is clear that the
creators of that Regulation were led by the principle of "favor
divortii." (63) This favor-tendency is, for example, realised through a com-
(62) Indeed, a difference has to be made between the goal of legal security on the one hand
(improving the foreseeability of solutions), and goals such as preventing a loss of rights on the
other hand. Not only in the second category but also in the first can the EU take on a more or
less liberal stance in the execution of powers in the field of unification of IFL: it is possible for
*e EU, in the search for IFL uniformity in the area of solutions for IFL problems of family legal
terminology, to achieve a liberal or less liberal regulation whereby the IFL rules are measure
according to either .the "softest" or "strictest" EU member state.
(63) For more about the favor divortii principle in the Brusselii Regulation, see V. VAN DEN
EEOKHOUT, "Internationaal privaatrecht en migratierecht. De evolutie van een tweesporen-
beleid", I.c. and V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "Nieuw internationaal echtscheidingsprocesrecht: Brus-
sel II", Tijdschrift voor Civiele Rechtspleging 2001, pp. 69-102. The new Brussels II Regulation
does not introduce any changes concerning matrimonial matters. As regards rules on parental
responsibility, the new Brussels II Regulation pretends to have taken into account the principle
of the interest of the child (see for example consideration 12 of the Regulation, "The ground of
jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility established in the present Regulation are shaped
in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity (... )",
resulting inter alia in the principle that jurisdiotion should lie in the first place with the Member
State of the child's habitual residence. One could argue that thus, the elaboration of the principle
of the liberal access to justice has been reduced. But whatever what may be said about the ela-
boration of the principle of the interest of the child in the Regulation, the general idea of the
EU is apparently that childs in general benefit from being subjected to a European regulation,
particularlY' from the benefit of the system of mutual recognition: in consideration 5 of the n~w
Brussels II Regulation, it is said "In Ol·der to ensure equality for all children, this Regulation
covers all decisions on parental responsibility, including measures for the protection of the child,
indepently of any link with a matrimonial proceeding." The grounds for non-recognition are kept
to the minimum required, as well in Brussels II as in the new Brussels II Regulation. Moreover,
in the new Brussels II regulation, judgments on rights of access and judgments on return that
have been certified in the Member State of origin in accordance with the provisions of the Reg-
ulation should be recognised and enforceable in all other Member States without any further pro-
cedure being required. See in this context, on the Brussels Regulation, H.U. Jessurun
D'OLIVEIRA, "The EU and a metamorphosis of private international law", in J. FAWOETT,
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position of rules of jurisdiction that express the principle of liberal access
to justice. Moreover, no hierarchy is made between the different grounds
on which competence could be based. If one had chosen a stricter way of
creating rules of competence then this would certainly not have been
favourable for the influence of the favor divortii in the Regulation. (64) The
draft of the Brussels II Regulation explicitly chooses not to reduce the
amount competent fora - and in line with that, not to reduce access to the
courts - even though forum shopping could be avoided. This is even more
remarkable as one has not yet reached the stage where conflict law between
member states is unified and so forum shopping becomes all the more plau-
sible. The principle of favor divortii is not only elaborated in rules of
jurisdiction: the principle remerges in the way in which the Regulation
views recognition and enforcement, amongst other things through the flex-
ibility and the provision of extra chances to achieve a divorce when one has
not been granted it in the first place. This is because judicial decisions
where the granting of divorce has been refused do not fall under the pro-
visions of Brussels II. At the same time it is plausible that authorities in
several Member States are competent, which could result in people being
able to re-try a divorce somewhere else. All in all one can say, then, that
Brussels II certainly has a liberal spirit.
Brussels II limits itself in the unification of PIL rules to those of proce-
dure. The question then is in how far the same goals apply regarding the
rules of applicable law; particularly goals concerning the abolition of hur-
dles to mobility, international harmony, legal security, no loss of achieved
rights, and the creation of rules that stimulate access to the family legal
Reform and development of private international law : essays in honour of Sir Peter North, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2002, pp. 111-136, especially pp. 131-132, arguing that too m~lch prece-
dence is given to the free circulation of decisions, thus neglecting the interest of the child, in
Brussels II. See also on the issue of "interest of the child" in the new Brussels II regulation
D. VAN ITERSON and M. Sumampouw, I.e.
(64) Due to the fact that the rules of applicable law and substantive law differ with regards
to divorce in the different member states, a stronge~ canalisation would coincide with more hur-
dles in the possibility of getting a divorce. There are historical examples of how a particular
order is prescribed concerning the relevant authorities in order to make one's own authorities
exclusively competent, which then results in the hampering of the possibilities of achieving a
divorce. See for example, V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "De wisselwerking tussen materieel recht en
internationaal privaatrecht: eenrichtings- of tweerichtingsverkeer 1", Rechtskund·ig Weekblad
1999-2000, pp. 1258-1259, and also V. VAN DEN EECKHOU'J;', Huwelijk en echtscheiding in het Bel-
gische conflictenrecht. Een analyse vanuit de invalshoek van nationaliteitsgemengde partnerrelaties,
Antwerpen: Intersentia 1998, p. 210 etc. For an example where people are forced to address their
own national authorities and face negative consequences by then not being able to address
another judicial institute, see the Treaty of Istanbul (ClEO-agreement on the changing names
and surnames of Istanbul of 4 September 1958). The treaty provides the national authorities
with the exclusive jurisdiction on liberalising tendencies such as trans-sexuality. H.U. Jessurun
D'OLlVEIRA ("Weg met exclusieve jurisdictie in het namenrecht", N.J.B. 1985, p. 1305) calls this
treaty a "hurdle" to new developments in trans-sexuality. See for recent developments, R. LAW-
SON, "In de schaduw van Goodwin", note under Rb. 's Gravenhage 14 October 2002, N.J., CM-
Bulletin 2003, p. 313.
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institute. In the manner in which Brussels II was created the goal of
achieving international harmony has lost its importance regarding the
drafting of rules on applicable law: in the regime of recognition in Brussels
II there is no control through conflict laws. In other words, in areas where
the regime on recognition is applicable in the sense of the Brussels II Reg-
ulation, enough freedom is left to draft rules on applicable law without
having to worry about the problems and goals regarding international har-
mony.
In areas where there is no such regime on recognition, one should
logically still look at the goals of international harmony in the phase
of drafting rules of applicable law. One would, in other words, have to
look at how international recognition can be helped by the rules of
applicable law. On this point, a question arises after reading the ECJ
Gilly case (65), namely, that the jurisprudence of the ECJ could lead
to a connection with nationality or domicile as being the most impor-
tant in such cases, if the principle of connection through nationality or
domicile proves to be the most promoted. Seen from the perspective of
the goal of international harmony, the connection through nationality
seems to me at first glance the best option as authorities are more
likely to recognise foreign judicial decisions when the national laws
have been applied to those involved, particularly concerning foreign
judicial decisions on own citizens.
Or is the goal of international harmony not the only issue - or per-
haps not of primary interest - and therefore do other issues (such as
the importance of "integration") need researching, issues that the ED
perhaps also sees as being important? (66) And do these point in the
same or another direction if it comes to create rules of applicable
(65) Gilly Case (ECJ 12 May 1998, C-336)96). The case revolved around a double tax
payment regarding the use of the principle of nationality. For a short analysis of the Gilly
case, see A.H. VAN HOEK, Internationale mobiliteit van werknemers: een onderzoek naar de
intemetie l1,ssen arbeidsreeht, EG-reeht en IPR aan de hand van de Detaeherin(jsriehtlijn, Den
Haag: Sdu Uitgevers 2000, p. 290 etc. also concerning Conflicts Law. Van Hoek introduces
the requirements "reasonable and customary." Whether this can be used in PIL in terms
of a "suitable and reasonable criterion" has to be seen through the ultimate goal accorded
to PIL. 'fhe question is then for which goal the criterion is useful and reasonable. In the
past (V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "De wisselwerking tussen materieel recht en internationaal
privaatrecht: eenrichtings- of tweerichtingsverkeer 1", I.e.) I have differentiated two possi-
ble "ultimate legitimisations" in PIL, namely showing respect to peoples culture on the one
hand, the stimulating of situations of international harmony on the other hand (whereas
the goal of international harmony via the drafting of rules on applicable law must probably
be seen in the light of rules on applicable law combined with rules on jul'isdiction and
recognition).
(66) And that in light of the Gilly case, could also be used as a legitimisation in the interest
of those issues and could link in with the "reasonable and suitable" criterion. Considerations that
could also fit in with the jurisprudence of the ECHR - (see particularly EHRM Gaygusuz v. Aus-
tria, 16 September 1996) regarding the question when a difference in treatment can be justified-
in the search for "objective and reasonable justification."
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law ~ (67) An interesting remark in this context can be formulated from
the Garcia Avello case, namely that from this case it seems that the
ED is less inclined, or so it seems - albeit perhaps only in the treat-
ment of people with multiple nationalities in (international) law on
names ~ to reason in terms of considerations in the sense of "respect
for culture" or "integration". At any rate these issues do not seem to
have first priority when compared to goals such as legal security and
international harmony for the increase of mobility.
It can be expected that if the ED decides to regulate IFL aspects of
certain family legal .issues through Regulations, then the ED will unify
rules of recognition before unifying rules of applicable law. If there are
already european rules on recognition, the argument of drafting PIL
rules for the goal of harmony in international decision-making becomes
irrelevant, then the question arises on the basis of which arguments a
useful agreement on applicable law can be drafted - or on what basis
the ECJ could judge a national regulation on applicable law on its mer-
its. If, hypothetically, there were no european rules on recognition at
all, it would still not seem unreasonable to suggest that the ECJ would
be asked for a ruling at some stage on (national) rules of applicable
(67) See also the reaction of the advocate-general and the EOJ in the Garcia Avella case
regarding the Danish argument that no difference in treatment may be made between those
with multiple nationalities and national citizens because the same treatment meant an
increase in better integration. The case revolved around the question of whether the Bel-
gian authorities were forced to deviate from the Belgian rule that gives right of way to the
Belgian laws on names if the person in question had more than one nationality of an ED
member state (including the Belgian nationality) and whether the Belgian approach was
contrary to the ban on discrimination as stated in articles 12 and 17 of the EO Treaty. The
EOJ answered positively: the Belgian practice to forbid any exeception to the application
of Belgian rules was not allowed, Interesting are the remarks made by the advocate-general
in the conclusion of the Racene case (no. 79) about how integration should be viewed in
this context. See also the conclusion of the advocate-general in the Garcia Avello case
(2003-10-02 0-148/02, no. 72) where he states that, "I would moreover take issue with the
argument that the principle of non-discrimination seeks essentially to ensure the integra-
tion of migrant citizens into their host Member State. The concept of "moving and residing
freely in the territory of the Member States" is not based on the hypothesis of a single
move from one Member State to another, to be followed by integration into the latter. The
intention is rather to allow free, and possibly repeated or even, continuous, movement
within a single area of freedom, security and justice", in which both cultural diversity and
freedom from discrimination are ensured". In the Garcia Avello case, article 12 is used to
justify a d'iffeTence in treatment between "Belgian" citizens and "Belgian-Spanish" citizens
(see especially Garcia Avello, consideration nrs. 34, 36 and 37). On the issue of considera-
tions about "integration", "respect for culture" and "mobility" in PIL, see also V. VAN
DEN EECKHOUT, De wet toepasselijk op het huwelijk en de huwelijksontbinding van nation-
aliteitsgemengde paren. De impulsen van de confrontatie van het I.P.R. met "gemengde"
partnerrelaties voor de ontwikkeling van het conflictenrecht, PhD KDLeuven 1997 (corre-
sponding mainly with the vision of the EOJ) and V. VAN DEN EECI\:HOUT, "De wisselwer-
king tussen internationaal privaatrecht en materieel recht", where I distinguish between
respect for the "State legal culture" (on the issue of respecting the pTobitions of foreign law,
see inJm, footnote 78 and following and footnote 91) and respect for "the culture of an indi-
vidual". See also inJm footnote 70.
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law. (68) In such a situation the argument of attaining international
harmony through rules on applicable law would still be valid. Then, the
issue of how this interest should be seen in the light of other interests
would need looking at as far as it concerns rules of applicable law.
So, in short, mainly in areas where the goal of international harmony has
been reached via the creation of a recognition regime, the question emerges
about what issues need to be consulted when drafting rules on applicable
law. (69) If the goal of international harmony has been achieved via rules
of recognition, is it then possible to build any imaginable system of appli-
cable law and reason purely in terms such as "integration" and "respect for
culture," (70) or are there other "European legal" issues that need to be
looked at that can affect the eventual outcome?
Above I already mentioned the consideration that people should not be able
to loose there granted rights when migrating. (71) Perhaps it could be argued
that much importance should be attached to this concern, especially in the
context of the ED, as peoples' reasoning will be that if rights could be lost by
(68) See infra, footnote 82, ahout the Johannes Case (C-430/97 1999-06-10). If, hypothetically,
there were no european rules of recognition, it would also not seem unreasonible to suggest that
the ECJ would be asked for a ruling at some stage on national rnles of recognition. In such an
evaluation by the ECJ of national rules of recognition - as in the evaluation of national rules
of applicable law - considerations could corne forward such as the concern to combat fraud, the
concern to create a system that is non-discriminatory on the basis of nationality, e.g. through
the creation of a system of "contrale de la loi convenahle (see, on this issue, in the context of
Belgian "ules of recognition concerning divorce, V. VAN DEN EEOKHOUT, De wet toepasselijk op
het hnwelijk en de hnwelijksontbinding van nationaliteitsgemengde paren. De impnlsen van de con-
frontatie van het I.P.R. met "gemengde" partnerrelaties voor de ontwikkeling van het conflictemecht,
PhD KULeuven 1997, pp. 612-617. See also in this context, in the EU1'Opean rules of recognition
on divorce, article 18 of the Brussels II regulation, concerning "differences in applicable law",
and saying "The recognition of a judgment relating to a divorce, legal separation or a marriage
annulment may not be refused because the law of the Member States in which such recognition
is sought would not allow divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment on the same facts".
On the allegation of discrimination on the basis of nationality in the e1trOpean jnrisdiction rnles
of the Brussels II regulation, see and H. TAGARAs, "Questions speciales relatives a l'unification
communautaire du droit international prive de la famille", in MELANGES EN HO~afAGE A JEAN-
VICTOR LOUIS, BRUXELLES, Editions de l'UniversHe Libre de Bruxelles 2003, pp. 460-462 the
references made in V. VAN DEN EEOKHOUT, "Europees echtscheiden", page 85, footnote 64 and
65.
(69) And, so, in other areas the question is whether other issues point in the same direction
or in others regarding the goal of international harmony.
(70) In doctrine a difference of opinion has developed on how these goals should he attained.
From this perspective, some pleaded for a link with the laws on domicile (see for example
M. TRAEST, I.e. with reference to Lenaerts and Van Heeke) and others pleaded for a link with
the laws on nationality (see for example A.V.M. STRUYOKEN, "Les consequences de l'inMgration
europeenne", I.e. p. 355). Struycken argues: "Le respect de l'identiM nationale empechera la
Communaute de denier aux Etats membres Ie droit de preferer, en principe, pour des motifs
respectables Ie rattachement a la loi nationale, du moins pour leurs propres ressortissants."
(71) This issue often links with, and is often even similar to the issue of international har-
mony. But one can already state that in order to achieve the goal of international harmony it
is a necessary and sufficient condition to unify rules of recognition. Concerning the goal of not
losing ones attained rights though, unification of rules of recognition could be seen as a necessary
condition but not a sufficient one.
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migrating, they won't be stimulated to use their right of mobility. Concerning
this last point I think it is possible to see an analogy with considerations of
ECJ in other matters. So, for example, mutatis mutandis, regarding the issue
that one should not be allowed to loose attained rights, the recent Hacene
Case (72) may be relevant. Hacene revolved around residence, but the reason-
ing, in both the judicial decision and the conclusion of the advocate-general,
is about how one can avoid discouraging the movement of people if they per-
ceive the risk of loosing certain rights they would otherwise have.
Concerning the drafting of rules of applicable law with regards to the
issue of avoiding that people may loose rights, I can make the following
remarks. Firstly, the interest in this issue may be seen as one of the great-
est reasons (73) to unify rules of applicable law. (74) The next question is
(72) Hacene Akrich C-I09/01 2003-09-23. On Hacene Aluich, see already above, footnote 53.
(73) Unless one would understand "obtained rights" and/or the concern to prevent a loss of
rights in a very strict sense, namely that the rights that ought to be protected only deal with
judgments (claims that already have been put before authorities) and don't include "law" or
"rules" as such (claims that someone could rely on, but actually did not). For discussions on
"obtained rights", see for example I. JOPPE, Overgangsrecht in het internationaal privaatrecht en
het fait accompli, Arnhem: Gouda Quint 1987, 360 p. and A.V.M. STRUYCKEN, '''s lands wijs 's
lands eel''' (afscheidscollege K.U.Nijmegen, 31 August 2001, KU..Nijmegen 2001, 41 p. In this
hypothesis, it seems as if there would also be more room to plead for unification of rules of appli-
cable law with a preference for the law of the domicile, or with a preference for the systematic
application of the lex fori. It could already be stated here that reference to the domicile criterion
would be able to encounter forum shopping, preference for the lex fori would not. Moreover, ref-
erence to the domicile criterion would lead to the following situation: only if one would move
to a Member state with a more liberal substantive family law, unification of IFL in this sense
would have a "liberalising" effect (in this opposite situation, the person who claims rights in
court before moving, would be better off than the one who does not); on the issue of whether
the "State of origin" would, subsequently, be forced to recognise what is obtained in the "State
of residence", the problematic is very similar to what will be discussed below.
(74) See for an analysis of the necessity of unifying rules of applicable law from an idea that a lack
of uniformity would mean that people lose rights when migrating, Dethloff, (N. DETHLOFF, "Argu-
ments for the unification and harmonisation of family law in Europe", in K. BOELE-WOELKI (red.),
Perspectives for the unification and harmonisation of family law in Europe, Antwerpen: Intersentia
2003, pp. 37-64, specifically p. 52 where she states that: "Only unified rules on conflict of laws can
ensure internationally uniform decision-making so that a status existing in one state, whether created
by operation of law or based on a court decision, remains in effect in another". According to the Action
Plan work needs to be done on the unification of rules concerning Conflicts Law in order to avoid
f01'1tm Shoppl:ng. Dethloff also focuses on the need to avoid "a race to the court" - a situation which
would hamper the equality between the parties - in her argumentation to unify rules of applicable
law. See also, on the concern of avoiding forum shopping, as well as on the concern of avoiding a "race
to the court", Jantera-Jareborg, "Marriage dissolution in an integrated Europe", Yearbook of private
international law, 1999; especially concerning the need to unify at the same time ancillary claims if
one reasons from this perspective. See in this context also infra, footnote 81. See also, on PIL besides
IFL, recently the argumentation in the Explanatory memorandum with the Proposal for a Regula-
tion of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations
("Rome II"), Com (2003) 427(01), e.g. p. 7: "( ... ) the harmonisation of the conflict rules also facili-
tates the implementation of the principle of the mutual recogntion of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters. The mutual recognition programme calls for the reduction and ultimately the abo-
lition of intermediate measures for recogntion of a judgment given in another Member State. But the
removal of all intermediate measures calls for a degree of mutual trust between Member States which
is not conceivable if their courts do not all apply the same conflict rule in the same situation."
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then of oourse how exaotly, from this angle, rules of applioable law oan best
be unified. It must indeed be noted though that not all forms of unifioation
oan guarantee that people would not loose any rights when migrating: a
oomplete following of the domicile prinoiple would, for example, inour a
loss of rights, beoause after migration the oonoept "domioile" will have a
different filling-in than before whioh results in other rules being applioable,
which in turn can imply a loss of rights. (75) A similar remark oan be made
concerning application of the lex fori. (76) All in all the above seems to sug-
gest a preference for nationality as a connecting factor, particularly if
national oitizens of one Member State move from this "home" country to
another Member State (77). Thus, in a rather paradoxical way, it oould be
argued that difference in treatment of ED-citizens on the ground of natio-
nality would be the best way to remove obstacles to free movement and
thus to ensure the principle of freedom of movement and to.
Assuming now that the analysis based on the angle of "avoiding the loss
of rights" points, in general, to a link with nationality, another question
arises: does one want to go as far as saying that all prohibitions that exist
in the national law of a Member State be respected? (78) If so, would this
not be a break on the process of liberalisation of IFL as wanted by the ED,
through ensuring that one does not get less, but also no more, rights than
one had in ones home country? Such a strict application of the principle
of nationality would lead to people being condemned to having their
(75) This is recognised by DETHLOFF, I.e., p. 52; "( ... ) even if the rules on conflict of laws are
unified, a loss of legal positions can arise with a change in residence. Such a loss of legal position
will always occur where the connecting factor is not immutable, but where the applicable law is
based on the habitual residence in question". Dethloff does not go into the hypothetical that
such a new situation would create a "gain" ; the primary concern here is to ensure that those
involved are guaranteed ofkeeping their old rights; something they could not have if the crite-
rion of domicile were used. On the attaining of new claims in the ease of migration and the ques-
tion of whether these new rights could be used when returning to one's home country, infra,
(76) One could of course suggest that as long as authorities from the sending state (the home
country) as well as the receiving state (the residence state) are competent, no loss of rights would
exist in the case of application of the lex fori: one would then be able to start proceedings in
ones "own" authorities in order to enforce the law of the home country, and the country of res-
idence would in turn have to recognise the result. One argument against this is that this practice
could only be executed by those able to return to their home country to start proceedings. This
situation thus also seriously hampers the access to justice and could even be seen as a form of
class justice. Should one not be able to get the same "service" in the new country of residence
to exact ones rights!
(77) It could be argued that in drafting IFL-rules this way, one would respect the "principle
of mutual recognition" - often understood as a preference for the legislation of the Member State
of origin. See, for a recent discussion of the principle of mutual recognition - especially dealing
with the question whether the principle of mutual recognition could function as a hidden choiee-
of-law-rule, M. FALLON and J. MEEUSEN, "Private international law in the European Union and
the exception of Mutual recognition", Yearbook of private international law 2002, pp. 37-66. See
also M. TRAEsT, O.C.
(78) In the case of missing rules of recognition, one could argue that only in acting this way
a situation of international harmony can be attained.
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national law applied with all its advantages and disadvantages, and could
be contrary to the favor and liberalising tendencies as laid out in the Brus-
sels II Regulation. Should we then not have to work towards a system that
is more favor-centred? Or at least a system that has the advantages of
using nationality as a connecting factor - no loss of rights when migrating-
and includes favor-tendencies?
The above can be illustrated by the problems surfacing with registered
partnerships and same-sex marriages. These are areas where there are still
no European rules of recognition. In the Belgian PIL on same-sex mar-
riages the principle of nationality is primarily used - at least in the legisla-
tion itself. (79) The consequence of this is that the entry to the institute of
a same-sex marriage is very limited. The question arises if the Belgian regu-
lation can be seen as one that is in line with ED concerns: can the differ-
ence in treatment on the basis of nationality be justified (80) on the basis
of considerations in the drafting of international harmony and no-loss-of-
rights? (81) Or can one speak of discrimination on the grounds of nation-
(79) See M. PERTEGAS SENDER, "Huwelijk tussen personen van hetzelfde geslacht in Belgie :
internrechtelijke en internationale implicaties", in P. SENAEVE en F. SWENNEN (red.), De her-
vormingen in het personen- en familierecht 2002-2003, Antwerpen: Intersentia 2003 and P. WAU-
TELET, "Note sur I'ouverture du mariage aux ressortissants etrangers de meme sexe", to be con-
sulted on the electronic journal tijdchrift@ipr.be 2004 (1), pp. 97-105 (www.ipr.be). It has to be
noted immediately that the Belgian practice has been changed in january 2004, with the publi-
cation of a new circular letter. See the circular of 23 January 2004, Belgisch Staatsblad 2004,
27 January 2004 (also to be consulted on tijdschrift@ipr.be 2004 (1), containing rules of how
should act in the field of applicable law and recognition. Concerning the issue of applicable law,
through the use of the principle of the "exception of public order", a system is established which
is similar to the Dutch legislative system! Thus, the Belgian system has been transformed in a
much more "liberal" system. Nevertheless, the Belgian legislative system is still interesting to
study, both seen from the perspective of studying a "European typical case-stUdy" (the Belgian
legislative system doesn't seem to be "unique" in its way of dealing with PIL-issues of new forms
of family life, see the comparative report K. WAALDIJK, "Major legal consequences and proce-
dures of civil marriage, registered partnership and informal cohabitation for different-sex and
same-sex partners in nine European countries, to be published. This report also gives information
about the Belgian way of dealing with PIL-issues of registered partnerships and informal coha-
bition in Belgium) and from the perspective of future developments in Belgian legislative PIL
(with the introduction of the circular, an administrative change has been realized, but the ques-
tion rises how the Belgian legislator will handle in the future). In this context, it is worth men-
tioning the remarks of P. Wautelet: Wautelet appears to be, in principle, in favor of a system
such as the Dutch system, but argues that if one is looking for a convenient connecting factor,
one should one should take into account the fact that marriage legislation is connected with
migration: ("( ... ), il ne faut pas oublier que Ie mariage a des consequences dans bien des
domaines du droit, notamment sur les droits des epoux en matiere de securite sociale et de titre
de sejour. Ces consequences doivent etre prises en compte pour determiner quelles attaches sont
necessaires pour permettre I'application du droit beIge."
(80) Difference in treatment on the basis of nationality seems to be consistent with jurispru-
dence from the Garcia Avello case (see footnote 67). Concerning reservations that can be made
in this area see infra.
(81) Citizens of countries that recognise same-sex marriage can still make claims to this insti-
tute in Belgium. However, citizens of countries that do not recognise same-sex marriage cannot.
Analogous to the Hacene case, one could argue that people that hail from countries where same-
sex marriages are prohibited would not be discouraged from migrating to a country that would
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ality, (82) seen from the point of view that it is unfair to use the nationality
criterion so that oue person would achieve entry into a family legal insti-
tute and another would not. Should one not be thinking more along the
favor-lines? (83) It is possible that the principle of non-discrimination on
the grounds of nationality could be interpreted in such a manner that a
pure link with nationality would no longer be allowed. It is even possible
that access to the institute of same-sex marriage would be seen as a human
right (84); this would mean that the preference for nationality should be
not give them the possibility of a same-sex marriage as they were never able to have one in the
first place. Must one reason on a strict basis only regarding the "no-loss-of-attained - rights" 01'
can one expect a more pro-active stance form the ED whereby the ED would itself create such
rights 1 See for example mutatis mutandis (revolving around the field of residence) the strict form
of reasoning in Racene Akrich in the case of article 10 of the Regulation 1612/68, in stark con-
trast to the dynamism in the Carpenter Case (C-60/00 2002-07-11, where article 49 EC is inter-
pretecl in the light of the ECRR). On experiences in PIL in a negative sense, see V. VAN DEN
EEoKHouT, "De wet toepasselijk 01' het huwelijk en de huwelijksontbinding van nationaliteits-
gemengde partners", o.c. concerning the situation where parties are married uncleI' a system of
law where a divorce is not possible and after a change in nationality one of the parties claims
that on the basis of the "old" applicable laws divorce is not possible and whereby the other party
claims that divorce should now be possible.
(82) The Johannes case is interesting in this context (see s1lpra, footnote 41). The ECJ decicled
that article 6 EC (after revision, article 12 EC) does not stand in the way of the law of a member
state that uses the nationality of the persons in qnestion as reference, should leacl to a European
Civil Servant having a larger burden in one case than another who is in effect in the same sit-
uation. Traest (M. TRAEST, I.e.) argues in his commentary on this case that after the corning into
effect of the Treaty of Amsterclam with the basis for rules for competence in the field of I'lL
the ECJ would - at any rate now - be competent and therefore the ECJ may now judge differ-
ently. See also M. FALLON, comments with Johannes, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial 2000,
Pl'. 247-249.
(83) Regarding the hypothesis that no rules of recognition are available ancl the nationality
link can be pleaded from a angle of "respect for international harmony" I personally stated
that only using nationality as a reference would be discriminatory. I also stated that the prin-
ciple of international harmony is not the only one and that holding on to the principle of
nationality could also be seen as disproportionate in order to achieve the goal of combating
fraud. See, mutatis mutandis, concerning registered partnerships, V. VAN DEN EEOKHOUT,
"Huwelijlr en echtscheiding in het Eelgische conflictenrecht", o.c. At that time, I was mainly
orientated on the "non-european context", but the issue now prominently also rises in a "euro-
pean context)'.
(84) See, recently, EORR Karner 24 July 2003, 40016/98, EHRO 2003/83, with comments of
J. GERARDS. See also the contribution of O. Lassoie, reasoning from the principle of article 12
ECRR and pleading from this perspective for liberal rules of applicable law, to be published in
Revue d1l Droit des Etrangers. See also, mutatis nl1tfandis, the judicial decision by the German
Oonstitutional Oourt of 4 May 1971 (see V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "Ruwelijk en echtscheiding in
het Belgische conflictenrecht", D.C., Pl'. 300-301) where the argument of freedom of marriage, a
constitutional right, was used in order to set aside international harmony. See in this context
D. VAN GRUNDERBEEOK, Beginselen van personen- en familierecht. Een mensenrechtelijke bena.-
dering, Antwerpen : Intersentia 2003, 1'.201, where she states that the entering into of a marriage
that has references in more than one legal system, it is possible under article 12 ECRR that IPL
rules are used as an integral part of national law and foreign laws are made applicable. (Van
Grunderbeeck is referring to ECRR, nr. 9057/80 X t. Zwitserland, 5 October 1981), "as far as
those substantive rules don't violate as such a convention" -Van Grunderbeeck illustrates this
last sentence with the example of the violation of a convention by the national judge himself
in the application of foreign law, for example if this judge refuses to allow a marriage on the
basis of a foreign interdiction on marriage which is contrary to the ECRR" (See also, ECRM
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corrected in some cases ~ as is recently realized through the introduction
of a new circular, using the concept of "exception of public order" to mit-
igate the nationality prefrence. The Netherlands paid more attention to
arguments of this last type. At any rate the Dutch government can be
labelled as being much more liberal; people that had a claim to enter into
marriage in their country of origin keep this claim when they migrate to
the Netherlands, but the category of people that have access to this insti-
tute is interpreted even wider. The fact that a person hails from a country
where same-sex marriages are illegal is not of consequence in Dutch PIL
and therefore does not hamper the possibility of entering into a same-sex
marriage in the Netherlands. (85) Access is given to liberal substantive
law (86) through the liberal construction of PIL. (87) The Netherlands does
not limit itself so that people, when they migrate, don't lose claims, but
when they migrate "new" claims are allowed.
Perhaps it is not necessary from an ED perspective to issue such favor-
type PIL rules, they don't seem prohibited anyway. From the perspective
of improving mobility, one can say that if one has a favor-type system peo-
ple would possibly be stimulated to move abroad because when they
migrate they could possibly gain more rights than they had before migrat-
ing. Viewed from this perspective, intra-communitarian mobility can only
be improved. But put in this way, a following question arises. Is it possible
that migration would still be hampered if, hypothetically, the attained
rights in the new country of residence in a migration at a later date to the
11 April 1996, appI. No. 24001/94, Gill en Malone tegen VK, by T. LOENEN, ("Onderscheid naar
sekse de rechtsorde uit of er juist weer in", FJR 2002, pp. 228-234). The former clearly shows
us that in view of human rights, the principle of nationality should not be taken too far. In my
point of view, even when no human rights are affected, the principle of nationality should not
be used absolutely. See V. VAN DEN EEOKHOUT, "Huwelijk en echtscheiding in het Belgische con-
flictenrecht", o.c.
(85) A same-sex marriage that comes into existence in the Netherlands would not have to rely
upon recognition abroad.
(86) Especially along the lines of article 2 Wet Conflictenrecht Huwelijk; requiring for mar-
riage that one partner has residence in the Netherlands or has Dutch citizenship (since April
2001, the same applies to partnership registration (art. 80 a(4) Book 1 CC, as amended by the
law of 13 December 2000, Staatsblad 2001, nr. 11). Whether or nog the law of the Country of
origin of a foreigner permits or recognises registered partnership or same-sex marriage is not
relevant in the Netherlands (see K. BOELE-WOELKI, "Registered Partnerships and Same-Sex
marriage in the Netherlands", in K. BOELE-WOELKI and A. FUOHS (eds.), Legal Recognition of
Same-Sex Oouples in Europe, Antwerpen: Intersentia 2003, p. 43).
(87) In doctrine (Dethloff, I.e., p.51, see already supra, footnote 74) it has already been said
that a too liberal rule of jurisdiction would contravene the protection accorded to the weakest
party in a family legal case. But one could also imagine the case where both parties would like
to proceed in the same way in a situation where one country is far more liberal than another.
On the issue of creating European liberal rules of applicable law and favor-tendencies, also in the
sense of creating party-autonomy, see for discussions on PIL outside of IFL, J. Israel, "Europees
internationaal privaatrecht. De EG, een comitas Europaea en "vrijheid, veiligheid en rechtvaar-
digheid", NIPR 2001, pp. 135-149, especially pp. 140-141, with further references (e.g. to Base-
dow and others).
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country of origin cannot be taken back? Here again, it is possible that cer-
tain analogies can be made with the ECJ and the advocate-general in the
Singh and Hacene Akrich cases. (88)
If we assume a flexible regime of recognition as being the one proposed
then a PIL regulation as the Dutch one in the case of same-sex marriages
would not pose any problems in the area of international harmony and the
favor-principle would also be accomplished. If no regime of recognition is
anticipated, then a PIL rule as the Dutch one for same-sex marriages could
be problematic for the goal of international harmony regarding decisions.
The ED could thus end up becoming a patchwork. (89) But at the same
time one can remark that in the long term, one could possibly achieve an
even more general favor-movement with international harmony as the
result: if a same-sex marriage is enacted in the Netherlands then it is pos-
sible that the authorities abroad could reason that as the marriage has
already come into existence it might as well be recognised, especially seen
from the issues about harmony in decision making and the no-loss-of-rights
due to migration. In a situation where other ED countries and even the
country of origin (if a remigration takes place) would reason as above then
one could speak of a combined tendency in the direction of liberalisation
and an achievement of the goal of international harmony created by the
fact that a country has a soft recognition system. It is then imaginable that
the country of origin would eventually not only adapt the rules on recog-
nition but also the rules on applicable law. (90) It would then perhaps also
become possible that people whose legal relationship exists in an purely
internal context could be given a family legal institute, especially if it
would be seen as unfair not to give them access - for example because oth-
erwise it would be felt as being a kind of reverse discrimination, in other
(88) The difference is that within this matter it is questionable whether this kind of claims
could be categorized as "intracommunatarian" cases that fall under the EU competence, see
infra. But see in this context also the Carpenter case in which article 8 ECHR was central, par-
ticularly in the light of the goal of freedom of movement of services.
(89) Analogous from Jessurun D'OLIVEIRA ("Vrijheid van verkeer voor geregistreerde partners
in de Europese Unie. Hoog tijd!", N.J.B. 2001, aD. 5 - see also H.U. Jessurun D'OLIVEIRA,
"Freedom of movement of spouses and registered partners in the European Union", in J. BASE-
DOW e.a. (ed)., Private law in the international arena - liber amicorum Kurt Siehl', The Hague:
T.M.C. Asser Press 2000, pp. 61-77), who in light of the freedom of movement of persons talks
about"a Europe with different speeds, and, seen from a territorial point of view, a chechered
freedom of movement which ha'l to jump over countries not allowing registered partners in". For
more about this see II.2.3.b.
(90) In which case one could talk of backward progression. On the phenomena of the taking
in of techniques in rules of applicable law through introducing them first in rules of recognition,
see V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, De wet toepa'lselijk op het huwelijk en de huwelijksontbinding van
nationaliteitsgemengde partnerrelatie, D.C.; also in this context V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "Book
review of G. Steenhoff (red.) Een zoektocht naar Europees familierecht", Rechtskundig Weekblad
2001, p. 895-896.
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words, people that never migrated could otherwise be held back. In this
sense the final result could be a liberalisation of substantive Family Law.
Of course it could seriously be doubted whether the ED itself would try
to exert such dynamisms - see, again, mutatis mutandis, discussions in
migration law, particularly on the competence to regulate issues of family
reunion, with the phenomon of "reverse discrimination", and dealt by in
the ECJ in cases like Singh and Hacene Akrich. But even so, it may be pos-
sible for the Member States themselves to reason that, once PIL-rules as
the Dutch ones are in force, taking into account "European internal market
concerns", this could force same-sex marriages to be recognised elsewhere
in Europe, because it would otherwise mean a hurdle to the freedom of
movement. In such a case, one would be able to notice an "indirect effect"
of european rules and logic on national rules.
From the previous analysis one could deduct that European concerns
combined with respect for human rights point in the direction of liberalisa-
tion of (International) Family Law. Of course, it has to be noticed imme-
diately that there is naturally a large discussion about the right of respect
of cultural identity of the member states. This is a discussion that could
inject subtle distinctions in the tendency of liberalisation of IFL that has
been started by the ED. (91) Here, possibly, the specific character of IFL-
compared to PIL outside of IFL - will be able to have an impact.
III.2.3.b. The liberalisation of (International) Family Law and/or public
legal claims. Oase study : Working with new forms of family life of European
creation
The issues of liberalising (International) Family Law as such need to be
differentiated from issues of public legal claims based on family legal rela-
tionships and the meaning of IFL in this context -issues that have a number
of areas that do fall within the competence of the ED.
It is interesting in this context to note a judicial decision from the Bel-
gian labour Court of Liege of 12 June 1990, where nationality was denied
importance in deciding whether an Italian was underage or not - in order
to evaluate social security rights of this person: reference to the nation-
ality criterion was in this context seen as being contrary to the EC
(91) See also infra, under IV.2.4, and 8upra, footnote 38 as well as 81tpra, footnote 70, the
argumentation of Struycken. See also no. Dethloff, I.e., p. 56 regarding the consideration that
restrictions on free movement arising form substantial legal differences are only permissible if
they are justified by public interest, are not disproportionate, and are furthermore in agreement
with the fundamental rights (with reference to the Bosman Case of the Court of Justice). See
also, mutatis mutandis (Bell adresses the issue of the variety of national laws on partnerships)
and as well with reference to the Bosman case, M. Bell, I.e., for a discussion of "combat of
fraud"and "protection of the national cultural or moral values" as justifications for keeping up
obstacles to free movement.
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treaty. (92) Could it thus be that IFL rules need balancing and possibly
need including in a more liberalising trend because of the realisation that
their application hampers public legal claims 1 Could it also be that IFL
rules that are an answer to preliminary questions (93) may, sometimes,
have to be left aside 1 With an eye on the case of Liege, we now reach the
issues of public legal claims.
Once again, several can be made clearer if from a PIL perspective the
question is asked as to the manner in which the ED will react to new
"forms of life," such as non marital partnerships, registered partnerships
and same-sex marriages. In my point of view, this analysis should take
account of two different developments: on the one hand the manner in
which international aspects of new "forms of living together" are organised
through PIL rules and, on the other, the manner in which these new forms
of living together, that appear in an international context, have public
legal consequences attributed to them, combined with the role that PIL
plays in this. It is indeed conceivable (94) that the field of PIL becomes
more liberalised in a sense that international legal relationships can subtly
create such new forms of living together and dissolve them: this can also
have an effect on the manner in which the rules of jurisdiction, applicable
law and recognition are drafted. But a liberal IFL does not necessarily
mean a liberalisation of public legal claims on the basis of these forms of
living together.
In my contribution "De vermaatschappelijking van het internationaal
privaatrecht" (95) I came to the conclusion that a differentiation must be
made, and developed an analysis of developments in "a non-European con-
(92) Liege Labour Court, 12 June 1990, JTT 1991, p. 438, referred to by M. FALLON, "Droit
familial et droit des communautes europeennes", Revue t,.i1nest,.ielle de d,.oit fam~iliaI1998, p. 374,
footnote 20.
(93) For the treatment of preliminary questions in the law regulating the rights and duties of
Community civil servants, see KOHLER, "Zum Kollisionsrecht internationales Organisationen:
Familienrechtliche Vorfragen im europalschen Beamtenrecht", Ip,.ax 1994, 416. See in this con-
text also ECJ, 5 February 1981, N.J. 1981/654, with conclusion of Warner and comments of
Shultz (Schultz refers in this context to the Gunella and the Devred cases),
(94) On the expectations on whether the EU shall be busy in this field, see V. VAN DEN EEOK-
ROUT, "Internationaal privaatrecht en migratierecht. De evolutie van een tweesporenbeleid," I.e.
p. 78 as well as L. Th. L. PELLIS, "Internationaal privaatrecht. Echtscheiding, kinderbescherm-
ing en gezagsvoorziening, meerderjarigenbescherming, aIimentatie, adoptie (1998-2002), WPNR
2001, pp. 1055-1063, where he states that the EU should look at PIL rules on non-marital part-
nerships, registered partnerships and homosexual marriages from a human rights perspective.
Pellis refers in this context especially to the Action Plan, whereas it was stated that the principle
of freedom of movement should be completed witb the principle of respect for fundamental
freedoms, including the principle of protection against discrimination. There is much discussion
about whether or not the Brussels II Regulation is applicable regarding the dissolving of homo-
sexual marriages. See, P.M.M. MOSTERMANS, "De wederzijdse erkenning van echtscheidingen bin-
nen de Europese Unie", NIPR 2002, pp. 263-273, with references.
(95) See V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "De vermaatschappelijking van het internationaal
privaatrecht. Ontwikkelingen aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw", 1.c. see supra under IIL1
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text" from this point of view. I pointed out that it is possible that IFL is
being liberalised, but that at the same time in other areas of the law a more
restrictive system is being created, as for example in Nationality Law. I
therefore made a distinction between on the one hand tendencies to liber-
alise Dutch International Lineage Law and, on the other hand, tendencies
to hamper public legal claims based on lineage relationships in a non-Euro-
pean context. The previous means that an evolution of IFL in liberalising
sense is completely useless for several people if there are no public legal
consequences attached to family legal relationships, especially if through
denying public legal consequences the family legal relationships are ham-
pered. (96)
Altogether, the same sort of warning fits within a European context.
Also in the European context when one talks about liberalising tendencies
one should clarify in which area liberalisation is taking place. On the one
hand one has the question to what extent the ED will interfere in PIL
regulation of new forms of living together and, on the other hand, one has
the question if these new legal practises can be linked to the principle of
freedom of movement of ED employees and their families. In a wider sense,
which legal consequences could be attributed to these family relationships?
Imagine an employee in a ED context wishes to use his right to freedom
of movement as a ED citizen and wishes to take his family members with
him. The field of PIL grants him the possibility of a registered partnership
that could also be recognised in another country as a registered partner-
ship. This rule of PIL, however, can remain completely meaningless if the
employee cannot take the person in question with him as a family member.
This situation is still particularly prevalent if the term "spouse" as defined
in the Regulation 1612/68 is strictly applied as being a married partner of
another sex. This is particularly the case if the ED keeps holding on to a
traditional and fairly conservative definition of family members. (97) In
other words, even if the ED would interfere with IFL concerning these new
(96) See V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "De vermaatschappelijking van het internationaal
privaatrecht. Ontwikkelingen aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw", \.c., pp.155-156.
(97) In the Reed case a softening happened in the jurisprudence of the ECJ: if a member
state grants non-married partners "social advantages" - and thus the issue was qualified - then
the member state must also grant these advantages to those that migrate (on the patchwork
and a situation of "two speeds" that could come to pass within the ED because of this see, H.D.
Jessurun D'OLIVEIRA (supra footnote 89) and J\!I. BELL, I.e. For a critique on the restrictive defi-
nition of developments see K. WAALDIJK, "Towards equality in the freedom of movement of
persons", in K. MICKLER (red.), After Amsterdam: sex1wl orientation and the European Union.
A guide, Brussels, ILGA Europe 1999, pp. 40-49. See in this context also M. BELL, I.e. In the
Council Oommon Position of 5 December 2003 (see supra, footnote 53), it is stated that "family
member" also includes the registered partner if the legislation of the host Member State treats
registered partnership as equivalent to marriage. And see in this context also EOJ, 7 January
2004, C-117/01.
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forms of living together, it does not automatically mean that the term fam-
ily member would be widened. (98)
It can be said, however, that the PIL interference could at any rate be
an important impnlse in the widening of the definition of family mem-
ber. (99) The question is also whether the ED can be more progressive than
the European Court of Human Rights, (100) concerning forcing member
states to recognise new "forms of life," particularly when the analysis is
from a perspective of free movement of persons, (101) or other claims that
are granted in EC Law. If so, then the process of Europeanisation of PIL
could mean a wider process of liberalisation, and it would also mean that
a larger group of people would attain derived rights of residence in EC Law
than before. If not, then the liberalisation via unifying PIL rules will be
limited. All in all, the foregoing leads to the conclusion that one should be
not too quick to speak of a process of liberalisation within Europe.
III.2.3.c. Loolcing fnrther a field
Exactly how far Europe will systematically liberalise on a pure PIL field
will become clear when Europe takes the reigns of matters that, seen from
this perspective, really matter - namely, PIL regulations on marriage and
(98) In this context see, H.D. Jessurun D'OLIVEIRA, "Geregistreerde partnerschappen en de
Europese Dnie. Kanttekeningen over de internationale reikwijdte van het wetsvoorstel", Lc.,
regarding the differences that must be made between the regulation of access to certain institutes
on the one hand, and the consequences of the granting of those types of living together in Euro-
pean legal sense on the other.
(99) A comment that is perhaps useful here is that if in future, EO regulations on the termi-
nology of "family members" are widened, then this could also be an important impulse in uni-
fying PIL rules in this field: the necessity to have European PIL rules in this field would then
also become more acute. Thus, the interference of the ED with IFL would not only have con-
sequences for public legal claims, but also vice-a-versa the regulation of public legal claims could
provide an impulse for ED interference in IFL. If one looks at it this way, the freedom of move-
ment of persons (or in a wider sense the fundamental freedoms) and the regulation of IFL
become linked and a reciprocic way of influencing eachother emm·ges.
(100) On the jurisprudence of the EOJ see D. Van Grunaerbeeck,o.c.
(101) On this see V. VAN DEN EEOKHOUT, "Internationaal privaatrecht en migratim·echt. De
evolutie van een tweesporenbeleid", Lc. For a short allusion on this see M. FALLON, "Droit famil-
ial et droit des communautes europeennes", Revue trimestrielle ae aroit familial 1998, pp. 361-
400, especially pp. 383-384. It may be important to point out that in this context the ROJ has
already been more lenient in interpreting article 8 ECHR than the ECHR itself. See especially
the Oarpenter case (11 July 2002, C-60/00) and the note by FordeI' (EHRC 2002/76), specifically
on the area of the importance of "illegal residence" and the possibility to have a family life else-
where. This could be clarified by the fact that the ED ,vishes to protect family life in OI'aer to
eliminate obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. See
also H. TONER, "Comments on Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State", 11 July 2002 (Case C-60/
00), Enropean Jou1'nal of Migration and La.w 2003, pp. 163-172 and H. TONER, "Oommunity law,
immigration rights, unmarried partnerships and the relationship between European Oourt of
Human rights jurisprudence and Oommunity law in the Court of Justice", Web Jonrnal of Cur-
rent Legal Is8ue8 2001, 5, on the fundamental question of whether the Community Institutions,
Member States or Court of Justice can develop a distinctive undel'standing of what respect for
family and private life means in the context of Community migration law.
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lineage. The sensitive areas of marriage and lineage that, more so than for
example divorce and Marital Property Law or Law of Succession can have
a direct impact on the question to what extent someone has the right of
residence (102), have not yet been brought up by the ED. The fact that
Europe has not yet touched upon a PIL ruling of creation of family rela-
tions - particularly in legal relationships concerning external aspects - is
probably also the reason why the theme has not yet been discovered by
those that wish to aid foreigners. For jurists oriented on legal aspects con-
cerning foreigners, ED interference will probably only become a sensitive
issue if PIL regulations of family forming and family reunion of third coun-
tries come to pass.
It has to be noted that ED interference is currently in full swing in the
area of consequences concerning residence of family relationships between
and with persons from third countries. (103) But a regulation of IFL
aspects of these issues has not yet been put to table. Thus, one can only
speculate on the manner in which the ED wishes to regulate IFL issues:
there are no clear signals on how one wishes to regulate marriage and suc-
cession.
In the following though I wish to make a couple of comments on ED
interference in PIL issues with legal relationships that have an external
aspect. As far as the ED wishes to interfere with IFL issues that have a
purely communitarian relationship in a liberal manner, a question rises on
whether the same will happen in PIL situations that have external aspects.
IV. - ED INTERFERENOE IN LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
WITH EXTERNAL ASPEOTS
IV.!. - 18 the E U competent?
The primary question is whether the ED has the competence to regulate
PIL relationships with external aspects. In answering this question one has
to differentiate between regulating external aspects in Regulations and the
issue of the (exclusive or not) competence of the ED to make and enter into
agreements with third countries - the so-called "treaty-making power" of
the ED. (104) Hague Conventions become all the more superfluous if the
(102) It may seem paradoxical that especially those areas where ED interference could be seen
as most expected are the ones that are not (yet) being dealt with. International Marital Law and
International Lineage Law are crucial matters in terms of filling in family legal terminology in
EC Law as well as in general the improvement of legal security.
(103) See the Directive on the right of family reunification, O.J., 3 October 2003.
(104) If one assumes that there is no competence, then one could ask the question whether
national PIL can still be influenced by what is regulated on a :European level. Regarding the
impact in Dutch Community PIL of ED activities, see the recent revision of international juris-
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ED exercices "external" competences; then, the focus of the discussion
shifts from the issue if European IFL should have priority on Hague Con-
ventions in intracommunautarian cases, into the debate if European IFL
should deal itself with external aspects - and should also have priority on
Hague Conventions in such cases. In the Brussels II Regulation, one pre-
tends to ensure that the 1980 Hague Convention on child abduction will
contine to apply within the European Community, but that the Regulation
adds a number of rules intendend to complement and reinforce the applica-
tion of the Convention within the Community.
External aspects can appear in PIL Regulations when the scope of the
Regulation has been widened so far as to include citizens of third countries
residing in the ED or ED citizens residing in a third country; external
aspects also appear when the Regulation regulates an a,spect of applicable
law resulting in the application of the law of a third country. In the Brus-
sels II Regulation the rules on jurisdiction are drafted in such a manner
that it is certainly plausible they may also be applicable in a case concern-
ing non-ED citizens or ED citizens that are not residing in the ED. (105)
The same conclusions can be made about recognition and execution in
Brussels II.
Probably, if one aims to unify PIL in issues that are linked to the prin-
ciple of freedom of movement of ED-citizens - or to other freedoms, such
as the freedom of services -, this already necessarily entails the regulation
of some situations that have "external" aspects. So, for example, through
the foregoing one could already come into contact with situations involving
third-country nationals: imagine the issue of recognition in a Member State
of a divorce judgement, rendered by the authorities of another ED-Member
State, between a German employee and his Nigerian woman, living in the
Netherlands - a situation that is indeed falling within the scope of the
Brussels II Regulation.
The question is whether ED interference could go a lot further. I refer,
once again, to the fact that ED competencies in this area are regulated in
Title IV of the EC Treaty with the heading "Visas, asylum, immigration
diction in the Netherlands which has been almost entirely influenced by the Brussels I Regula-
tion and Brussels II Regulation. The same goes for changes made to the Wet Oonflictenrecht
Echtscheiding in light of Brussels II. Thus it is conceivable that the importance of issues on legal
security, expected patterns of EU citizens and citizens of tllird countries as well as international
harmony could be al'gnment enough for consistency, even if it is not seen as an al'gument for
giving the EU competence. See already, on a possible indirect effect, above, undel' 3.2.3.a. See
also, muta,tis mutamdis, on the effect of Hague Oonventions on national rules, J, ERAUW, "De inv-
loed van internationale verdragen en van de Europese l'egelgeving op een Belgische codificatie
van ipr", to be consulted on www.ipl..be
(105) This is independent of one's view on the scope of Brussels II. See V, VAN DEN EECK-
Hou'r, "Enfopees scheiden", I.e. And also in this context articles 8 and 12 of Brussels II. On arti-
cle 8 see, M. TRAEST, o.c" p. 296 and p. 312. See also the new Brussels II Regulation concerning
rules of jurisdiction on parental responsibility.
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and other policies related to free movement of persons." This time I want
to emphasise "visa, asylum and immigration." It is abundantly clear that
the ED is becoming more active in this area. In this context we can see the
ED regulating at least the residential status of citizens from third countries
and their family members - possibly even going that far as granting a right
of freedom to long-established citizens from third countries, similar to the
right of freedom of ED-citizens, and thus also resulting in a derived right
of residence of family members of non-european citizens. At the same time
we can see the ED being confronted with problems and issues of IFL, even
if it is only because family legal terminology is used in these regulations -
see the Directive on the right of family reunification.
It may be useful to remember in this context that the Europeanisation
of PIL happened at the same time as the Europeanisation of Migration
Law. Even though the link between aspects of Migration Law and aspects
of PIL was perhaps more of a coincidence then not, the fact that both
fields are shored under one title could be important when searching for jus-
tification of ED interference in IFL issues that are not purely intra-com-
munitarian. A number of questions then arise, which I shall illustrate using
matters of marriage and divorce. In order for marriages and divorces to
freely circulate within the ED, is it necessary that member states not only
recognise one another's judicial decisions on them, but also take on a com-
mon position on the recognition of marriages and divorces that originate in
third countries? (106) Is this more or less analogous to ED regulation on
the freedom of movement of goods that also has internal and external
aspects, (107) and also more or less analogous regarding the external com-
ponent of regulation on the freedom of movement of persons, namely the
creation of a common migration policy? (108)
If so, are we only talking about marriages and divorces between ED cit-
izens (or between an ED-citizen and a third country national), where a
(106) I touched on this at an earlier stage in V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "Internationaal
privaatrecht en migratierecht. De evolutie van een tweesporenbeleid", I.e. I stated that it may
be useful and relevant in this context to look for a common ground for European principles of
Family law. See, however, rather sceptical on the possibility to come into existence of a com-
prehensive system of European principles of family law, D. VAN GRUNDERBEECK, D.C. See on this
work also M. ANTOKOLSKAIA, "Book review of D. Van Grunderbeeck", FJR 2003, pp. 251-254.
(107) In other words, to what extent can the two pronged character (on the one hand the
regulation of intra-communitarian movement, and on the other ,the drafting of common rules on
"import" regarding all that comes from abroad) of the EU concerning Migration Law and the
freedom of movement of goods be extrapolated to the regulation of IFL matters by the EU 1
(108) To the extent that the regulation of migration from outside the EU is seen as being
derived from the freedom of movement (see article 61 EO and the considerations in the Hacene
case), but where one goes much further than one would think in first instance. Mutatis mutandis,
for a critique on the regulation by the EU on purely residential aspects of citizens of third coun-
tries see, H.U. Jessurun D'OLIVEIRA, "Familiehereniging in Europa. Werk in de Raad van
Europa en de EU", in M.-Ol. FOBLETs, B. HUBEAU en D. VANHEULE (red.), Migratie- en
m'igmntenrecht: recente ontwikkelingen, deel 7, Brugge 2002.
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decision can have an impact on the freedom of movement of persons? (109)
Or do we also need a common stance on the marriage of two citizens of
third countries? Is it possible that a regulation could come into being that
regulates legal relationships where there is no actual mobility, but only a
hypothetical possibility of mobility of those involved within the ED, or a
future mobility? (110) Or, to what extent can the two-pronged character
(on the one hand the regulation of intra-communitarian movement, and on
the other the drafting of common rules on "import" concerning all that
comes from abroad) of ED regulation of Migration Law and the freedom
of movement of goods be extrapolated to the regulation of issues of IFL
by the ED? Should, for example, IFL aspects, as family reunion of non-
Europeans citizens that do not move between ED member states,
regulated? Can this fall under the scope of article 65 EC-Treaty, namely
"measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-
border implications, to be taken in accordance with article 67 and insofar
as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market"? The cen-
tral question is therefore, to what extent ED interference should be limited
to the regulation of IFL aspects that relate tot the freedom of movement
of ED citizens, or to what extent this boundary and perspective can be
crossed? Does one need to leave behind the idea of regulating PIL aspects
that have a direct connection with migrating ED citizens?
Probably, the answer to several specific questions on the external com-
petence of the ED can be found in the ERTA-doctrine of the ECJ. (Ill)
And perhaps the review of this doctrine, and in general the answering of
several questions about the competency on external aspects, is in turn
dependent on the basic view one has on why the ED should interfere with
(109) One could think of a marriage that was enacted in a third country between an ED cit-
izen and someone f!'Om a third country. The derived right of residence of the citizen of a third
country and the using of the right to freedom of movement will probably depend on the answer
to the question on whether 01' not the marriage will be recognised by other ED member states.
(110) See, infra, footnote 112.
(111) This case WaS important in developing the theory of implicit external EU competencies.
On ERTA (Erta Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (1971) ECR 263) in PIL outside of IFL see,
C. Joustra, I.c. and, also dealing with IFL, M. TRAEST, O.C.. See also, recently, on the treaty-mak-
ing competence of the ED in the field of PIL, K. BOELE-WOELKI and R.H. VAN Oom:, "The
communitarization of private international law", Yearbook of priva.te interna.tiona.l law 2002,
pp. 1-36. For the mea-ning of ERTA-doctrine in Family Law, see also the Council Decision of
19 December 2002 authorising the Member States, in the interest of the Community, to sign the
1996 Hague Convention on jurisdiction, applicable Ia-w, recogni~ion, enforcement a.nd cooperation
in respect of parental responsibility and measures for the protec~ion of children, O.J., L048
21.02.2003, p. 1 and ~he Proposal for a Council decision autllOrising the Member S~ates ~o ra~iJY,
or accede to, the 1996 Hague Conven~ion (Com (2003) 0348 def). See also the Commission white
paper of 27 March 2001 concerning mutual recognition of decisions concerning parental
responsibility; it was decided that in accordance with ECJ jurisprudence on external compe-
tences to prevent member states from individually a-cceding to the 1996 Hague agreement to the
extent that rules on international jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement could frustrate com-
munity rules, particularly Brussels II.
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aspects of IFL. Thus, the answer to the question to what extent the regu-
lation of non-communitarian issues is necessary in order to regulate intra-
communitarian issues, could be dependent on ones' vision of why the ED
should interfere in IFL: it is possible that differing answers will arise
depending on ones view of the Europeanisation of PIL - as explained
above, the definition of family legal terminology where it is necessary and!
or the creation of a system of legal security. (112) It is also possible that
in this case - as in an intra-communitarian context - the view on the jus-
tification of ED interference shall be of critical importance. Perhaps that
will also be important when answering the question of which sub-disciplines
(pure status questions or other family legal issues) and which PIL questions
(jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement) need to be for-
mulated. (113)
If the ED sees itself as being largely competent and also manages to jus-
tify this, then the next question is how the ED wants to achieve all this.
(112) In my interpretation, Basedow (J. BASEDOW, "The communitarisation of the conflict
oflaws under the Treaty of Amsterdam", OMLR 2000, pp. 687-708, specifically p. 701) looked
at the issue of "cross-border implication and the relations with third states" from the problem
of legal security. He looked at the situation of a German couple that had a divorce that was
recognised in England (Britain), but not in Germany. In the light of this he asked whether or
not the ED should interfere with the recognition of judicial decisions of third countries. Base-
dow uses, in first place, the situation where two ED members and a third country are involved,
but also extends the case to one ED member and a third country; "For the involvement of a
second member state may result from events which come about after the relevant occurrences,
e.g. from a subsequent change of residence of one of the parties which gives rise to an addi-
tional forum within the community". (It is interesting to note in this context that Niamh Nic
SHUIBHNE, "Free movement of persons and the wholly internal rule: time to move on 1",
OMLR 2002, pp. 731-771 : p. 736, stated that: "Another aspect of the wholly internal rule clas-
sified subsequently is the condition that the cross-border element in any given case must be
real, not just potential or hypothetical". Is it possible that there is a difference to be noticed
here between what is traditionally stated by the EOJ in terms of criteria of reviewing a case
where the freedom of movement of persons is violated on the one hand, and on the other the
justification of ED interference with Migration Law and IFL 1) Here Basedow still speaks of
ED citizens. But what if no ED citizens are party to the case 1 Elsewhere Basedow states that
under certain circumstances legal relationships where a third country reaches a decison on the
legal relationship between a citizen of a third country, should be taken into account. An oral
contribution made by Basedow is reproduced by B. ANOEL et MUIR-WATT, "La desunion
europeenne. Le Reglement dit "Bruxelles II", R.O.D.I.P. 2001, pp. 408-409, note 19: "( ... ),
selon J. BASEDOW, la liberte de circulation pourrait imposer aux autres Etats membres de
reconnaitre Ie divorce d'un citoyen d'un Etat tiers prononce dans son Etat d"origine alors qu'il
y residait encore, des lors que, son divorce a ete reconnu selon Ie droit international prive com-
mun de l'Etat membre ou il est venu s'installer ulterieurement."
(113) Ofr. see the issues discussed above in III.2.2. Here too the question arises as to whether
the ED should limit itself to matters of recognition of status issues or should move to regulate
matters of jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement in most areas of Family
Law. As I said, in his analysis, Basedow seems to embark from the principle of legal security
and international harmony: in his view, anything that enters the ED and/or circulates within
the ED must, in order to preserve legal security and international harmony, be treated the same
in every member state.
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IV.2.1. An approach in line with the intm-communitarian context?
From a migrants point of view it is perhaps not important who regulates,
but what the regulation ultimately entails. Seen from the migrants eco-
nomic perspective the central question of unification of IFL can then be
the following: to what extent will the ED in its regulation be liberal or
restrictive? By that I mean will the regulation of IFL support people in
their claims to rules of public legal issues or will they render them ulti-
mately weaker? Seen from an economic perspective, the most important
question regarding Europeanisation of PIL for non-European migrants is
precisely how IFL will be regulated and applied in situations where IFL is
determining in claims concerning the law on residence, Nationality Law
and in Social Security Law - in other words, in those areas where IFL
functions as a cornerstone. To the extent that the ED wishes to interfere
in a liberal sense with IFL issues that have a pure inter-communitarian
context, the question arises to what extent IFL will be used similarly in
situations that have external aspects. From the point of view of IFL as
such, as from an angle of IFL interfering with public legal claims, it will
be interesting to see how liberal the ED will be. Concerning unification, will
the ED unify according to the softest or the strictest national example?
Will the ED take a differentiated stance in relation to IFL rules concern-
ing intra-communitarian or extra-communitarian issues, in the context of
its liberalising tendency? A possible difference in approach could take place
in a direct or indirect way. An indirect difference could be made, for exam-
ple, by legislation, where rules of applicable law are summed up in order
to create a universal geographical scope, but through the differentiating of
a specific interpretation of the "exception of international public
order". (114) For example, in the drafting of legislation (115) regarding
rules of applicable law, a direct difference can be made by holding on to the
principle of application of laws on nationality on the one hand and one the
(114) As put forward in the context of communitarisation of "Rome I" and "Rome II". On
the possibility of coming to a "europese exceptie van internationale openbare orde", see supra,
footnote 106, on research by D. VAN GRUNDERBEEOK.
(115) Or in the review of national IFL by the EOJ. According to Fallon and MEEUSEN, the
application of the principle of mutual recogntion could lead to the application of the law of a
third-country. On the issue of reviewing the 10.10 of a third-country, especially from the perspective
of the principle of mutual recognition, see M. FALLON and J. MEEUSEN, I.c., pp. 64-65 whereas
they state "Whereas it is unacceptable to say that the law of a third State violates the EO
treaty, it should be perfectly acceptable to conclude that the application of such law designated
by the choice-of-law rules of a Member State obstructs intra-community trade and must there-
fore be rejected 'and' Altbough the law of third States is not subject to the supremacy of Com-
munity law and its content does not violate the latter, Memher States are prohibited from apply-
ing such law when its application would burden cross-border activities".
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other the principle of application of laws on domicile. Is it thus possible
that differences could be made between rules of applicable law applicable
to ED-citizens on the one hand, third-country nationals on the other hand,
or - within the category of third-country nationals - , applicable to third-
country nationals that are already allowed to reside (116) in the ED on the
one hand, and third-country nationals that still need permission to enter
into the ED on the other? In these different contexts, should one review
using a different assessment as the one formulated in the Gilly case (117)
that in using a connecting factor, this factor should entail a "suitable and
reasonable criterion", should the assessment of being a suitable and reason-
able criterion be executed in the light of another goal, or should one fill in
the assessements that are formulated in an intracommunatorian context in
another way when external aspects appear - for example, what could be
the importance of a "lack of reciprocity" in the relation with third
countries? Is there also more room here for reasoning in terms of "culture"
and "integration" or should the primary reasoning be one of "the reaching
of a situation of international harmony in decision making" and "no-Ioss-
of attained-rights"? It is true that so-called "European internal market
arguments", based on freedom of movement, can not be relevant as such
in certain "external" situations (118). But nevertheless, the same concerns
could still come into play through, for example, principles of human
rights (119) or principles of PIL themselves (120).
(116) And - if activities of the ED lead to the creation of a rigth to move freely within the
ED for third-country nationals - that may also be allowed under EO law to move within the ED.
(117) Supra, footnote 65.
(118) See also, mutatis mutandis, M. BELL, I.e., regarding migration claims of same-sex part-
ners, whereas he states "obstacles to free movement cannot be easily transposed to the situation
of third country national couples, either immigrants or asylum applicants, because such persons
do not enjoy autonomous free movements rights within the ED at present.
(119) Notable in this context are Ancel.and Muir-Watt (B. ANOEL et H. MUIR-WATT, "La
desunion europeenne. Le Reglement dit "Bruxelles II", I.e.), about the influence of European
Law and h1lman rights on IFL: "Meme si la portee des unes et des autres est encore tres incer-
taine dans leur interaction avec Ie droit international prive, on ne peut que lever leur ambition
commune d'imposer la continuite d'une relation familiale telle que consacree dans l'Etat d'ori-
gine, flit-ce au prix de la neutralisation de l'exception de fraude et, plus generalement, au ffiepris
des conditions auxquelles l'Etat requis en subordonne la reconnaissance. Ainsi, chassee du
domaine du reglement, la reconnaissance des decisions de dissolution des union para- ou pseudo-
conjugales a pourtant vocation it jouir au meme titre d'un regime aussi favorable, tandis que Ie
refus d'acces it la libre circulation europeenne n'empechera pas les decisions familiales des Etats
tiers d'y entrer sur la vague des droits de l'homme." See also, mutatis mutandis, M. BELL, I.e.,
whereas he tries to obtain the same results for people who are not able to refer to the freedom
of movement, arguing on principles of human rights.
(120) It is remarkable that N. Dethloff (I.e.) presents the issue of how to prevent a loss oflegal
positions or change in rights or obligations bef01'e treating issues in a specific European context.
See also on the possibility of an issue of international harmony of decision making becoming a
justification for the respect for the application of gender-discrimination law, V. VAN DEN EEOK-
ROUT, "Gelijkheid in het internationaal privaatrecht. Een kritiek op de gangbare structurering
van het debat", I.e., p. 187 footnote 54.
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As I mentioned before, PIL usually leave~ a fair amount of room for
manoeuvre. By this I mean that a couple of PIL dogma's, such as the
exception of international public order, fraud, (121) the treatment of those
with multiple nationalities, normally leave room for manoeuvre within PIL
rules. The question is then, to what extent the EU will allow member
states' variation on this point, and/or allow itself to vary in an intra-com-
munitarian or an extra-communitarian context. Next to this, it would be
interesting to see the manner in which one could try to hamper, through
IFL, public legal claims by EU citizens and citizens from third countries
that are accorded the same rights and, finally, citizens from third countries.
Seen from this angle, it is my view that a number of EOJ cases could be
analysed from an angle of their importance to IFL, even though these cases
were rarely about an issue of IFL. In this context an example would be the
Zentros-, Uberseering and Inspire cases. (122) These cases concerned the
right to establishment of legal persons, but interesting deductions can be
made regarding IFL, specifically in the field of possibilities that are open
to member states in the area of combating sham marriages, sham recogni-
tions, sham adoptions, and so forth. The interesting question then arises
about what impact the freedom of movement of persons can have on
national legislation, that pretends to attempt to combat fraud, but in actual
fact only tries to issue extra requirements. (123) Also, to what extent the
combating of fraud will lead to a difference in approach to claims based on
(121) As in a national perspective, the European perspective must deal with issues of fraud, in
particular sham mal'fiages, and with the question what impact the freedom of movement of per-
sons can have on national legislation that pl'etends to combat fraud but in actual fact creates
extra conditions (for an analysis of the impact of EO Law of the Dutch legalisation policy, see
P.B. BOELES, o,c.). A closer look shows that one is not always neutral in IFL when dealing with
international legal relationships. The former, in a sense that when one is confronted with citizens
in this legal order, imputations of fraud are formulated, whereas those imputations are not made
when one is confronted with citizens of a different legal order. See V. VAN DEN EEOKROUT, "Inter-
nationaal privaatrecht en migratierecht. De evolutie van een tweesporenbeleid", I.c., on imputa-
tions of fraud when people proceed before national authorities in order to dissolve their mar11age,
or R.U. Jessurun D'OLIVEIRA, "Kromme rectificaties", I.e. On the willingness to recognise foreign
judicial decisions when a date of birth has been changed. See supra, footnote 83, on the combating
of sham relationships via the strict use of the principle of nationality.
(122) Cases Zentros (0-212/97 (1999) EOR 1-1459), Uberseering (0-208/00 2002-11-05) and
Inspire Art (0-167/01, 2003-09-30). See on these judgements recently J. MEEUSEN, "Ret arrest
Inspire Art: Ret Rof van Justitie bevestigt zijn liberale benadering van de communautaire ves-
tigingsvrijlleid van vennootschappen", to be consulted on the electronical journal tijd-
schrlft@ipr.be 2004 (1), pp. 122-126.
(123) See the Zentros, Uberseering and Inspire cases in the context of the law on legal persons,
but more importantly is the analysis of tbese cases regarding harm to economic freedoms by so
called combating fraud, for example, by the issuing of rules to combat sham marJ·iages. On the
issue of sham marriages see Resolution 4 December 1997, OJ., 016 December 1997 and, in Eul'O-
pean jurisprudence, the Singh (0-370/90 (1992) EOR 1-4265), and Kadiman cases (17 April 1997,
0-351/95 EOR 1-2133), Kol (5 June 1997, 0-285/96 EOR 1-3069), European Oommission versus
Germany (18 May 1989 249/86) and recently, Racene Akrich (0-109/01 2003-09-23), JV 2004/1,
Oomments OAG and EOHR 2003/85, comments A. WOLTJER.
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family relationships or concerning intra-communitarian or extra-communi-
tarian disputes - for example because in the phase of reviewing legal rela-
tionships created outside the ED - thus not yet included in the freedom of
movement - they should perhaps not yet be reviewed in the light of respect
for fundamental EC freedoms. It is important to note here that some in the
Netherlands believe that the Wet op Formele Buitenlandse Vennootschap-
pen can - and should - still be used in extra-communitarian situations even
though it got a negative review by the ECJ in the Inspire case.
IV.2.2. Interaction with new forms of living together of non-European on-
gin
I am also interested to know in what manner the ED will interact with
(IFL-aspects of) non-European forms of family life. (124) How will non-
western concepts be built in and in a following phase how will they evolve
in terms of claims of a public legal nature? Will the ED also be liberal in
this context or will it be restrictive? (125) Will there be a greater form of
openness regarding foreign laws that dissolve a family tie or fail to recognise
it, than for foreign law concerning "unknown" forms of family ties; this, for
purposes of migration policy.
.It is important to mention the ECJ's Mesbah case in which the Court
seemed to he fairly liberal, (126) in the sense that the Court worked with
a wide definition of the concept of family and showed itself to be flexible
regarding forms of living together of non-European origin.
IV.2.3. Those with multiple nationalities and Nationality in general
In the Mesbah case there was, however, a problem of positive nationality
conflict. The solution to that problem turned out to be negative for the
(124) Previously the ED treatment of "new forms of living together" was discussed (III.2.3).
Here one can see that the ED is not only confronted with (new) family forms of European origin,
but also with family forms of non-European origin such as polygamy, forms of custody, and
more. The question is how these non-European forms of living together will be treated and what
IFL interference there will be.
(125) On the way in which the ED treats non-European family concepts, see M. Nys, L'immi-
gration familiale a l'epreuve du droit: Ie droit de l'etranger a mener une vie familiale normale :
de l'existence d'un principe general de droit a sa reconnaissance, Bruxelles: Bruylant 2002,
665 p. In defining "family" in the Directive on the right of family reunification, one limited one-
self to the "nuclear family," through a restrictive migration policy regarding citizens from third
countries. It is stated however that this is a minimum, and that member states are free to
diverge in creating a "softer" regime. On polygamy in the Directive on the right of family reuni-
fication, see consideration 10 en 11 and art. 4, 4° of this Directive. On unmarried or registered
partners in this Directive, see also consideration 10 and art. 4, 3°. On actual developments con-
cerning polygamy in English law, including the impact of developments in migration law, see also
P. SHAH, "Attitudes to polygamy in English law", IOLQ 2003, p. 369-400.
(126) Mesbah 11 november 1999, nr. 0-179/98, (RSV 2000/57). Regarding the co-operation
agreement EEO-Morocco, article 41 paragraph, the EOJ stated that the term "family members"
also meant those relations ascended from the employee and his wife that live in the member state
of residence.
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person involved: acting this wa,y, it became possible to refuse giving the
person handicap benefits, based on an association agreement with Morocco.
This is an important point. The classic European stance has been that
competence on nationality legislation should be left to member states. (127)
But judicial decisions by the ECJ point to the fact that member states are
not completely free in the way they treat people with multiple nationali-
ties. Some scholars go as far as saying that the Micheletti case ensures that
the member states nationality laws should be in congruence with Commu-
nity Law as they are not allowed to frustrate the freedom of movement of
persons. From that Na,tionality Law can be discussed. (128)
In ECJ jurisprudence, it is clear that the principle of freedom of move-
ment of persons has implications for the way in which member states
(127) Similarities can be made between the way in which EC Law and the laws on nationality
on the one hand and EC Law and IFL on the other are linked together. For laws on nationality
as well as IFL it is crucial to know how legislation is drafted in order to know who can make a
claim to EC Law and co-operation agreements between the EU and third countries. The group
of people that can claim the right of freedom of movement of persons can be increased or
decreased depending on how the rules on nationality or IFL are used. Just as this is important
for the definition of the term "family membcr", the definition of the term "nationality" is of cru-
cial importance in seeing whether people can lay claims on Community Law. The classic stance
of European institutions is that competence in terms of legislation on nationality falls to the
member states. In other words, member states are sovereign in this area. This means that thcy
can increase or decrease the size of the group that can lay claims as EU citizens on the freedom
of movement of persons through soft or strict laws on nationality. Until recently this has also
been the case for marriage and lineage that are also important concerning the term "family mem-
ber." After the Treaty of Amsterdam there seems to be a difference in the way in which laws
on nationality and IFL develop: where the EU has created its own competence in the field of
I1?L it has not (yet 1) done so regarding laws on nationality. Though with ECJ jurisprudence in
mind, one can say that member states are not completely free in the way they treat those with
multiple nationalities. But, thus, in short, IFL is confronted with the same questions, concerning
the freedom of movement of persons and non-discrimination of ED citizens as issues of nation-
ality are. In nationality issues a problem frequently arose concerning whether or not the situa-
tion was one of intra-communitarian or extra-communitarian nature (see for example the Manjit-
Kaur case (C-192/99, 20 February 2001, CMLR 2002, pp. 881-893, note H. TONER; H,U. Jessu-
run D'OLIVEIRA, comments with Manjit KAUR, JV 2001/124 and P. SHAH, "British Nationals
under Community law: the Kaur Case", E'I.1'Opean Journal of .Migration and Law 2001, 3,
pp. 271-278). The same could happen in IFL. Incidentally, also problems of a PIL nature are fre-
quently discussed in preliminary nature when discussing issues of nationality, for example when
deciding whether someone is a "spouse" in order to grant them then nationality of a member
state. Thus, there is a lot of interaction between the fields of IFL, nationality and EC Law.
(128) Regarding the question to what extent a member state is fully sovereign in determining
the granting of and taking away of its own nationality. From a clause in the Micheletti case stat-
ing that laws on nationality of member states must be in congruence with Community Law. In
certain doctrine (G.R. DE GROOT, "Comments with Micheletti", Migrantenreeht 1992, pp. 105-
110), it has been deducted that the laws of member states may not frustrate freedom of move-
ment of persons, which can have serious consequences for the nationality laws of some member
states for example regarding the loss of nationality by permanent residence abroad. See, G.-R. DE
GROOT, "Editorial. Latin-American European citizens. Some consequences of the autonomy of
the Member States of the European Dnion in nationality matters", Maastricht J01'rnal of Euro-
pean a.nd comparative law, 2002, p. 115-120). H.D. Jessurun D'OLIVEIRA, "Comment with
Michelet.t,i", CMLR, 1993, pp. 623-637. See also V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "Review ofM. Vande
Putte en J. Clement, Nationaliteit", Rechtslc"'ndig Weelcblad 2002, p. 594.
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should address situations of multiple nationality. However, the ECJ does
seem to differentiate depending on whether it is a situation of freedom of
movement of persons or not, and whether it concerns a citizen of and ED
member state or of a third country. (129) Occasionally, member states do
seem to have the freedom to regulate situations of multiple nationality, and
to use, or not, PIL techniques as a reference to solve a positive nationality
conflict or to insert extra conditions for those of a certain nationality. It
seems as though member states have a lot of freedom if one does not fall
within the standard model of being an ED citizen in a situation of freedom
of movement of persons.
Put generally, what needs to be done is to asses when member states
have the competence to regulate in situations of multiple nationality and
to use, or not, PIL techniques as a reference to solve a positive nationality
conflict or to insert extra conditions for those of a certain nationality. One
should include that if a situation of singular nationality arises, whether
PIL techniques could be used as a "reality check".
From a pure PIL perspective, the question arises as to the meaning of
this jurisprudence and to line of thought in relation to reality checks in
pure IFL situations. Can it be said that when one has a situation that has
to do with PIL legislation, (130) ED citizens, (131) and a confrontation
with positive nationality conflicts, that almost automatically it can be
stated that freedom of movement of persons is made part of proceedings -
or that it concerns an issue of Community Law - and there is no freedom
to resolve the positive nationality conflict. (132) If so, what is the meaning
(129) See the cases, Devred (Case Kenny-Levick, echtg. Devred t. Commission, Case 257/78 14
December 1979), Scholz (0-419/92 (1994) ECR 1-505), Micheletti (0-369/90 (1992) ECR 1-4239),
Mesbah. (11 November 1999, nr. 0-179/98) Also, Saldanha (C-122/96 1997-10-02, Manjit Kaur (C-
192/99, 2001-02-20) and others. Also the publication by J. MEEUSEN (J. MEEusEN, "Bipatridie
in internationaal en Europees verband", in W. DEBEUOKELAERE (red.), Opstellen aangebaden aan
Fans Heyvaert tel' gelegenheid van zijn vijjenzestigste verjaardag, Gent: Mys & Breesch 2002,
pp.219-233), specifically the comparing of Mesbah en Micheletti in this context. See also the
recent case Garcia AVELLO (2003-10-02 C-148/02).
(130) Of European origin or not.
(131) For an interpretation of the Garcia Avello case in the sense that the same approach be
taken when a child takes on the nationality of a non-EU citizens with the same rights as an ED
citizen (e.g. because his Dutch mother lives ··in another ED member state and is married to a
Russian man, see E. GUBBELS, "Recente ontwikkelingen in het Europees recht", Burgerzaken en
Recht, October 2003, p. 373. See also A.P. VAN DER MEl, "De juridische meerwaarde van het
Burgerschap van de Europese Unie (2)", Migrantenrecht 2003, nr. 9-10, pp. 325-326 and
R.U. Jessurun D'OLIVEIRA, "Ret Europese Hof activeert het Europese burgerschap", N.J.B.
2003/2238.
(132) In the Garcia Avello case one assumed that the case was about an issue of Community
Law. In the conclusion the ECJ pointed out that even if it was true that the children had not
migrated, their father at least had made use of his right to move within the ED. In the judge-
ment (no. 27-28), the Court states that "( ... ) a link with Community law does, (... ) exist in regard
to persons in a situation such as that of the children of Mr. Garcia Avello, who are nationals
of one Member State lawfully resident in the territory of another Member State. That conclusion
cannot be invalidated by the fact that the children involved in the main proceedings also have
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of this jurisprudence for the Brussels II Regulation? Thus, from a PIL
point of view an analysis of the above-mentioned ECJ jurisprudence could
be extremely useful.
IV.2.4. Room jar manoeuvre j01' the EU and/or membe1' states?
In effect the foregoing refers once again to the question of when a mem-
ber state can fall back on own IFL rules and whether member states have
own room for manoeuvre; possibly differentiated depending on whether it
concerns a matter of freedom of movement of ED citizens or something
else. (133) From the same perspective another question arises, namely as
to the value accorded to foreign judicial decisions that are made through
family legal proceedings that have impact on child benefit or pension pay-
ments and so forth. (134) In general this is the field of the value of foreign
judicial decisions and the legalisation of foreign acts. (135)
The previous raises another question though. On the one hand I dis-
cussed the way the ED approaches PIL rules, on the other hand one also
needs to point out a completely different issue, namely to what extent
member states have room for manoeuvre in the regulation of issues that do
not fall under the field of IFL but that can reduce IFL disputes to an
"empty cartridge". One could think of legislation on a specific minimum
age before a permanent permit of residence can be given or even claimed,
or also, additional conditions on a persons income. (136)
the nationality of the Member State in which they have been resident since their birth and
which, according to the authorities of that State, is by virtue of that fact the only nationality
recognised by the latter." The conclusion by the adyocate-general is interesting (nr. 61) : "In the
present case, the commission submits that the introduction of citizenship of the union, with its
attendant enjoyment of all the rights conferred by the Treaty - including, thus, the right to be
free from any discrimination on grounds of nationality - is a new factor enabling the court to
reach a decision in this case on a rather broader basis than it did in Konstantinidis. I agree that
article 17 makes clearer the applicability of the principle of non-discrimination to all situations
falling within the sphere of community law, without there being any need to establish a specific
interference with a specific economic freedom."
(133) See also IV.2.2.
(134) See regarding the use of foreign judicial decisions where a date of birth has been changed
the jurisprudence of the EOJ (Dafeki (0-336/94 (1997) EOR I-676l), as well as Ors en Kocak (0-
102/98 and 0-211/98 2000-03-14)) in relation to ORyB 14 January 1998 (concerning the rectifi-
cation of a date of birth by a Moroccan judicial decision and child benefit), USZ 1998/75, with
a note by A.P. YAN DER MEL See also HR 13 July 2001, NIPR 2002 afl. 3, no. 166, p. 303. For
a critical look at earlier prractices see Jessurun D'OLIYEIRA, "KTOmme rectificaties", I.e. On the
meaning of the Dafeld case and other judicial decisions by the EOJ on "non-European contexts",
see P.B. BOELES, o.c.
(135) In the above mentioned document of October 2001 (supra footnote 39) the Dafeki (C-
336/94 (1997) ECR 1-6761) and Konstantinidis (0-168/91 (1993) EOR 1-1191) cases are men-
tioned as examples of matters where the EOJ came into contact with issues concerning ciyil acts.
(136) See also article 7, 2 of the Oouncil Directiye of 22 September 2003 on the right of family
reunification, OJ., L251, 3 October 2003 : "Member States may require third country nationals
to comply with integration measures, in accordance with national law. With regard to refugees
and/or family members of refugees referred to in article 12 the integration measures referred to
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I shall once again refer to what I stated above, namely that one can lib-
eralise the rules of IFL without actually liberalising claims in the areas of
laws on foreigners, Nationality Law and Social Security Law. I fear that,
following the example of several Member States, also the ED may - be it
occasionally - do this, especially concerning claims from non-European cit-
izens. (137)
In short it is always necessary to make a distinction between IFL rules
on the one hand and public legal claims on the other, but nevertheless to
look at what will happen, together. For example, does it happen that rules
of European IFL are not used to regulate family legal preliminary ques-
tions that occur in the evaluation of a public legal claim 1 And if this hap-
pens, what is the consequence for the evaluation of said public legal
claim 1 (138) In a more general sense, are rules of IFL in either a liberal or
restrictive sense being linked together? (139) Is it, altogether, plausible that
things evolve in the sense that in an intra-communitarian context IFL
keeps on liberalising and helps to widen public legal claims, whilst at the
same time in legal relationships with external aspects the combination of
IFL and public legal claims results in a negative outcome 1
in the first subparagraph may only be applied once the persons concerned have been granted
family reunification." On the "integration" condition, see recently in the Netherlands Advies-
commissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, "Voorbij de horizon van 'Amsterdam''', Een advies over het
EUl'opese beleid inzake asiel, al'beids- en gezinsmigt'atie na 1 mei 2004, ten behoeve van het Neder-
landse voorzitterschap, fifth chapter, e.g. p. 34. (to be consulted on www.acvz.com). Earlier H.U.
Jessurun D'OLIVEIRA ("Haagse huwelijksverdrag 1902. Een terugblik en een aanmaning", N.J.B.
2002, 1597) mentioned that in the eventual European regulation of PIL matters concerning
applicable law on marriages, that a mechanism be created where national hurdles to marriages
with citizens from third countries could be set aside. On the possibility of having such an excep-
tion even if a Treaty says nothing about it, see V. VAN DEN EEoKHouT, "De wisselwerking tus-
sen materieel recht en internationaal privaatrecht: eenrichtings- of tweerichtingsverkeer1", l.c.
In my point of view, such a view should be heard, but it only concerns one part of the problem.
Just as important is the problem of member states adding conditions to PIL rules to hamper
family "creation" and family reunion of non-ED citizens. This has become clear by, for example,
the Dutch situation, as I have explained in V. VAN DEN EEOKHouT, "De vermaatschappelijking
van het internationaal privaatrecht. Ontwikkelingen aan het begin van de 2lste eeuw", l.c. In
this context see also the Mrax case (0-459/99 2002-07-25), on the requirement of visa's for third
country family members for migrating ED citizens.
(137) See also supra, e.g. footnote 37.
(138) As is currently the case in certain cases of Dutch Social Security Law, now that Oom-
munity IFL has been put to one side. Ofr. supra III.1.2.
(139) See for example the problems that exist when a "future spouse" does not fall under the
personal sphere of the Directive on the right of family reunification: see P. BOELES, "Nederland
en toekomstig Europees gezinsherenigingsrecht", Migrantenrecht 2000, pp. 179-187, note 12 and
H. STAPLES, "Gezinshereniging naar komend Dnierecht", NTER 2000, pp. 77-83: this omission
could imply that future spouses would have a particular difficult time in forming their relation-
ship if they are not allowed to a short stay with the goal of getting married, and if at the same
time in the country of marriage a marriage cannot be had because of, for example, religious pro-
hibitions concerning marriage.
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IV.2.5. Human Right8
Interweaved in all this and independent of whether or not one differen-
tiates between the intra-communitarian and extra-communitarian context
are the principles of human rights, that certainly need respecting. In the
above the importance of human rights has already been mentioned now
and again. (140) The issues are the following: respect for family life,
respect for cultural diversity, the ban on discrimination on the grounds of
nationality, (141) race, gender, and sexual orientation and so forth. It is
interesting to note that in the last few years doctrine has become more and
more interested in the relationship of European Law on the on hand, and
Migration law, Family Law and Human Rights on the other (142). It is my
opinion that also IFL issues should be considered more and more often in
those cases.
In discussions about ED interference in IFL, interests shall have to be
weighed; interests of the ED, of member states, of individuals. Particu-
larly, cases where interests clash will be interesting. When one talks of a
weighing of interests then it is interesting that in an intra-communitarian
context, debates in doctrine are momentarily on the possible difference
between ED member states, ED interference and the interests of the ED.
In essence it is all about differences in interest on a governmental level;
particularly in debates on sovereignty - and the right of cultural
autonomy - of member states versus the (economic) interests of the ED in
unification. (143) I wonder if in the extra-communitarian context the dif-
ference will be between the interests of the individual on the one hand and
that of the ED and member states on the other. Indeed, economic interests
of states and those of individuals seem to clash in debates on Migration
Law, in particular, and as I mentioned above, the regulation of IFL in the
evaluation of public legal claims can make a difference. (144)
(140) See supra, footnotes 64, 66, 80, 81, 82, 100, 101 and 119.
(141) Regarding the discussion to what extent the in article 12 included principle of non-dis-
crimination on the grounds of nationality is applicable between ED citizens or also in relation-
ship with citizens of third countries, see G. BRINKMANN, I.e., p. 303 as well as the conclusion in
the Mrax-case of the ECJ (C-459/99). See also, recently, P.B. BOELES, "Burgerrechten van
Europese burgers en derdelanders (toespraak Asser-Conferentie 2003)", in Europees bltrgerschap
en de rechtsgevolgen voor de burgers in de EU, Asser Instituut Colloquium Europees recht, 2003,
to be published.
(142) See for example the work of researchers such as Helen Toner and Helen Stalford.
(143) On this subject see DETHLOFF, I.e. p. 59 and also, M. JANTERA-JAREBORG, I.e. Also
M. ANTOKOLSKAIA, I.e, See also the issues in an intra-communitarian context, namely the intcr-
ests of individuals to have access to certain family legal institutes and to be able to use certain
family legal claims (and subsequently to have public legal claims), the interest of the ED to
rcach a liberal IFL and the interest of (some) ED member states to slow the tendencies towards
liberalisation, supra III.2.3.
(144) See on this in short, supra, footnote 29.
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V. - CONCLUSION:
ONE NEEDS TO TREAD CAREFULLY
V.1. - E U prospects
seen from current Dutch developments
The ED has already made the field of IFL into a method for the stimu-
lation of the freedom of movement of ED employees. The realisation that
decisions made regarding mobility are also determined by evaluations made
by people on the consequences of mobility on their personal family life is
an impulse for the drafting of a liberal European IFL. The fact is that thus
the sub discipline of IFL has entered the arena of economic considerations;
and subsequently, IFL developments will be resviewed in light of economic
considerations in the future. It is therefore important to look at lessons
that can be learned from developments and experiences in the area of EU
interaction with PIL outside IFL.
The current problems surrounding justification of the Europeanisation of
IFL, make it difficult to assess to what extent ED interference will be libe-
ralising in, for example, the field of granting residential claims or the gran-
ting of socio-economic advantages. A first glance uncovers a start to a
process of "liberalisation". Concerning the link between PIL and migration,
the ED is certainly operating in a liberalising sense: concerning family
reunion of family members of ED employees, the idea is that the integra-
tion of the ED employee in another ED member state only has advantages
if certain family members are allowed to join him; and it seems to be a task
for PIL in stimulating this right. The question is though to what extent
PIL interference will also lead to a widening of acceptance of claims in a
public legal sense. For example, will ED interference lead to more people
making claims to derived rights of residence than before as family members
of a ED employee? In legal relationships with external aspects it is com-
pletely unclear to what extent Europeanisation will be liberalising.
The questions asked regarding consistency, justification and positioning
of PIL in a national context are important for a national level as in a
European context. In time, questions will be asked about consistency in
European regulation as questions now are asked on a national level about
consistency in the use of PIL in a national context and PIL on a European
level. In a European context, comparisons can be made between proceed-
ings that do or do not concern the Statute on Civil Servants, the freedom
of movement of ED employees or not, citizens of associated countries or
not - all this coming from European legislation and jurisprudence, as well
as national jurisprudence dealing with European law. The questions are
important because current developments are afoot where policies of liber-
alising mobility (concerning the freedom of movement of ED employees
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and their families) as policies concerning the selective limiting of mobility
and residential legal claims (concerning migration of non-western peoples to
European countries) are pressing ahead, while policy makers at the saIne
time seem starting to realise that PIL may be a useful policy instrument.
Viewing everything from this angle, the central issue is the difference in
treatment in the regulation of aspects of IFL within the regulation of free-
dom of movement of ED citizens on the one hand, and outside the regula-
tion of the latter on the other. WiII the ED go for a fundamentally differ-
ent approach - creating either liberal either restrictive rules of IFL
depending on the merits of the case; or creating liberal IFL-rules in both
cases, but attaching a different importance to them if they are related to
migration claims - whether or not it concerns solely the freedom of move-
ment of ED citizens? If so, a two-track policy of IFL could come into
existence in ED legislation and jurisprudence. IFL could then function as
the echo or as an amplifier of migration policy, sharpening differences
between the stimulating of mobility of ED citizens within the ED on the
one hand, and on the other, the discouraging of migration from outside the
ED to its member states.
At this moment, an analysis of ED interference with IFL in relation to
the legal position of citizens of third countries is necessarily of a prospec-
tive nature. One can only wait and see how the ED wiII react. But at least,
I hope to have made it clear that if the ED is active in interfering in IFL,
from "a Dutch perspective" - i.e. the perspective of migrants confronted
with the Dutch actual system - there are elements of hope, but also fears.
Hope that the ED will crucially differ from the Dutch stance, as for exam-
ple on legalisation of documents, but fears that the ED may eventually do
the same, resulting in double practises regarding PIL. By that I mean lib-
eralising when stimUlating freedom of movement of ED citizens, but
restrictive when confronted with other situations.
In the drafting of a liberal European IFL, will it be possible that a
throwback wiII take place resulting from the taking into account of consid-
erations that are currently present in a Dutch national context? Important
will be to what extent European institutions will pay attention to issues
that are seen as important today in national contexts; wiII they copy the
national developments or wiII they resist them. From a Dutch point of view
one of the main questions is to what extent the Dutch situation and Dutch
issues will be extrapolated or pushed back by the Europeanisation of PIL.
Will the Europeanisation have an impact on the current affairs in a
national context by reviewing or stopping restrictive tendencies? Or will
tendencies that now exist in a national context get a wider" audience" via
Europeanisation? In the worst situation, Dutch practices could become the
model for European public legal claims linked to IFL.
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It does need to be said, though, that Dutch IFL rules as such can some-
times be inspiring, (145) especially if one would want to back out of a strict
use of the principle of nationality and would want to built in favour-ten-
dencies in IFL itself (146).
V.2. - Waking up sleeping dogs?
Where as I used to be afraid of waking sleeping dogs by mentioning in
public the use of using IFL for restrictive migration purposes in a Dutch
and Belgian context, (147) I now feel the time has come to openly address
this problem. There is a risk that structural developments will take place
through Europeanisation of PIL that extrapolate national tendencies. A
prospective analysis is welcome in my point of view.
Currently, there are a couple of Dutch jurists and legal academics that
are able to slow or stop certain Dutch developments by combining ED law
with arguments from fundamental human rights and basic principles of
PIL. (148) This type of analysis needs more attention.
Personally, I agree with many of the developments in the ED concerning
the Europeanisation of PIL, especially as the ED has the goal of attaining
international harmony together with favor-tendencies. (149) At the same
time I am weary that actual developments could drastically change if the
situation of non-ED citizens is concerned. Caution from this point of view
in this area is perhaps wise. Still keeping a watchful eye on ED interference
(145) That are sometimes based on the Hague Treaties - for example the Hague Treaty on
Marriage. If the EU would in the future, concerning domains not yet touched, be inspired by
the Hague Treaties, then there might be a basis for positive developments. Specifically in the
field of creating favor-typical IFL rules that also apply to extra-communitarian situations.
(146) It is worth to mention in this context that in fact, The Netherlands may be one of the
countries with the most criticisms of the EU unification process, but if Europe does continue
with unifying then it sees itself as playing a leading role. See for this what has been said by the
Dutch legislator during the preparation ofthe Wet Conflictenrecht Afstamming. See V. VAN DEN
EECKHOUT en M.V. POLAK, "Kroniek van het internationaal privaatrecht", N. J.B. 2002, pp. 507-
512.
(147) Particularly the legal orders where I, as a Belgian jurist, domiciled and working in the
Netherlands, am best in tune with.
(148) See for example, the reference that I made to cases pleaded by Mr. Tjebbes, in V. VAN
DEN EECKHOUT, De vermaatsckappelijking van ket internatianaal privaatrecht. Ontwikkelingen
aan ket begin van de 21ste eeuw, I.e., where Dutch judges considered obligations made by EO
Law regarding legaIisation and verification. In this sense the principle of freedom of movement
of persons stands in the way of verifying a marriage that took place outside Europe but that
was recognised in England (by Britain). See also the jurisprudence (also with Mr. Tjebbes),
where Dutch judges decide that the Hague Treaty on Marriages stops the Netherlands seeking
legaHsation for registration in the Basic Local Administrative Registry (GBA) of a marriage in
Nigeria. (See in this context, however, recently, HR 5 September 2003, N.J. 2004/5 and JV
2003/525, with comments from P. BOELES). See also, P.B. BOELEs, a.c., concerning the meaning
of the Dafeki, Kocak and Ors cases - in the context of Social Security Law - for the right of
residence of citizens of third countries that are themselves family members of EU citizens.
(149) See V. VAN DEN EECKHOUT, "Internationaal privaatrecht en migratierecht. De evolutie
van een tweesporenbeleid", I.e. Also in short, supra, footnote 20.
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in PIL from the perspective of non-ED migrants can certainly do no harm.
Whether or not the drafters of the treaty of Amsterdam had the intention
to relate IFL-issues in a direct way to Migration issues, there is a link
between IFL-issues and migration issues, and it is worth to be examined
how things work out now that the ED is unifying (aspects of) IFL as well
as (aspects of) migration law.
V.3. - The hope for a positive EU contribution
For those that wish to see a positive ED contribution for non-ED citi-
zens, caution is required. In order to attain a positive contribution, it
seems crucial to me that the ED keeps going along the positive lines
ah:eady started upon also concerning legal relationships with external
aspects. Although concerns about international harmony, no-loss-of rights,
legal security, non-discrimination and so forth may seem crucial if one
wants to interfere in IFL in order to integrate Europe, these concerns can't
be seen as if they are reserved for, or limited to the intracommunitarian con-
text. In my opinion, these concerns that could at first glance be labelled
as "European internal market arguments" finally just enlighten even more
principles that should be respected if one wants to draft or apply rules of
IFL. In other words, one always needs to search for a balancing of IFL
rules that take into account issues such as international harmony, no-Ioss-
of-rights, legal security, favor-tendencies whereas these are convenient,
respect for human rights, combined with a search for a link between IFL
and rules of a public legal nature in a non-frustrating way.
If the ED truly recognises the cultural, ideological and economic compo-
nents of IFL, (150) and these components are all treated in a honourable,
.consistent, convincing and reasonable manner that respect fundamental
rights, basic principles of IFL and principles of European law itself, only
then will Europeanisation breathe a wind of fresh air through Dutch IFL.
(150) And if the EU is aware of the risk of contaminating the debate, and the ideological and
economic arguments used in the debate (see supra, footnote 8) : one has to realise that also in a
European context one could want to hide behind, for example, principles of non-discrimination
on the grounds of gender, only to block the recognition of family legal relationships where the
people involved wish to make a claim on a residential legal, social legal, or nationality legal basis.
See supra footnote 106.
